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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of MSc in Banking and Finance at the 
International Hellenic University  
This dissertation he specific work consists of 6 modules. 
The first section reviews the financial crisis and its consequences on the financial 
system. 
In the second section there is an approximation of the capital adequacy ratio, a 
definition of calculation and the risks it contains. 
The third section refers to the Basel Committee as well as the development from Basil 
I to Basil II and end to Basel III for the safeguarding of the financial system. 
The fourth section includes the analysis of the main financial indicators of the Greek 
banks of the published financial statements of each bank. 
The fifth section analyzes the capital adequacy ratio as it is presented in the published 
statements of each bank. 
Lastly, the regression analysis is made in order to find any correlations between the 
financial ratios of the Greek banks and the capital adequacy ratio, as well as the 
conclusions. 
I feel obliged to thank my supervisor Ms. Kosmidou Kyriaki for the valuable 
cooperation and appreciation she has shown me. The professors who attended their 
lessons, one of them personally for the valuable knowledge that they took over and 
their guidance. The administration of the school that was always on the side of the 
students but also the other supportive staff at the university who was always present 
and willing to help. 
Lastly, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my parents, Achilleas and 
Katerina, and to my other family, who without them, without their loyalty, their curry 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a traditional financial intermediation, banks provide liquidity to the overall 
economy through transactions on their balance sheets, creating a situation of non-
affiliation of their assets and liabilities. This activity of maturity transformation is 
possible because the banks are supposed to be better able than their depositors to 
make the selection and monitoring of loans and borrowers and the diversification of 
their asset portfolio and because of this, banks are able to reduce information 
asymmetries in credit markets. 
Before the financial crisis of 2007 banks are performing nicely showing higher 
profitability and lend at cheaper costs to customers but soon this reduction in liquidity 
created trouble for many governments and financial institutions because regulatory 
bodies and governments provides huge bailout packages to financial institutions to 
overcome shortage of liquidity. The changing conditions of markets shows a 
challenge to regulatory bodies that how to manage liquidity and credit allocation. 
In times of debt crisis, as is the case today, the question arises whether Greek banks 
are capitalized enough to withstand the effects of the crisis. The above is defined as 
the existence of sufficient own funds by the banks, in order to be able to respond to 
the economic crisis, without requiring the intervention of the Financial Stability Fund 
by offering state funds to support them. 
The purpose of the work is to review the financial situation of the domestic and global 
financial system and to analyze the factors that led to the need for regulatory 
intervention measures with the creation of regulatory frameworks of Basel I, Basel II 
and Basel III, with a view to addressing systemically the risks of the financial system 
by imposing minimum capital adequacy requirements to prevent large banks from 
taking risks and to protect both depositors and themselves. 
In addition, this work aims at analyzing the method of calculating the capital 
adequacy of banking institutions and the financial analysis of the main Greek banks to 
detect the financial factors affecting the capital adequacy of banking institutions. 
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Chapter 1 
The financial crisis and its consequences for the Greek banks 
 
1.1 Review of the Financial Crisis 
 
 Paul Krugman in his book, The Return of Depression Economics (2009) supports the 
view that the global economic crisis started by America in 2008 was an almost-
anticipated and to a great extend predictable. This would, of course, be the case if the 
signs were not ignored omen of the past. In modern economic history there have been 
several cases countries which have suffered a slowdown in their economic activity, 
and have reached (or have passed) the threshold of recession. The most characteristic 
examples of countries were Mexico (1995), Japan (1996) and Argentina (2002). 
The current economic crisis seems to have largely paid off reputable economists and 
analysts, on the one hand because it happened abruptly after one seven years of 
growth and development and why it took place in America while everyone expected a 
slowdown in the global economy started from emerging markets. But before we look 
at why, how and how what went wrong, let's take a look at the events that preceded it. 
After 2001 the US and most advanced economies have been characterized by a period 
of intense expansionary economic policy to ward off recession. The Federal Reserve, 
for example, reduced the discount rate almost 27 times between 2001 and 2003 (Lin, 
2008). The low interest rates, facilitated by the huge commercial one’s surpluses that 
China and other countries used for the market US government bonds, encouraged 
rapid credit expansion. The simultaneous increases in property prices have 
encouraged further credit expansion, in particular through mortgages. In the US, the 
mortgage market loans with greater risk to households without the basic means to 
repay the loans took enormous dimensions. The American lenders, above all 
the Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac foundations, securitized these loans high 
risk, which they then sold to the entire financial sector system as assets. And this 
because of a combination of insufficient regulation and financial innovation. The 
second made it difficult for other financial institutions to assess the risks of these 
loans, which led to an increase in high-risk housing loans (Naudé, Wim 2009). Until the 
summer of 2007 the ever-increasing breach of the obligations on mortgages and the 
increasing number of seizures in the US, pointed out that the high-risk loan market 
was in crisis. The house and stock prices began to plummet, which reduced the value 
of household wealth in the US by trillions. OR solvency of Fanny Mae and Freddie 
Mac as well as some well-known international financial institutions, was threatened 
by these price falls of houses and shares.  
On September 7, 2008, the US government nationalized Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac. 
A year later, on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the 
largest in the history of the United States1. This led to a broad financial panic, with a 
large-scale sale of shares. Central to the sudden decline in the availability of credit, 
mainly in the interbank market, which has spurred the collapse of many businesses, is 
that which Taylor (2009) describes as "the problem of Queen of Spades problem. This 
refers to the fact that the titles they contained high risk housing loans have been 
                                                          
1 http://www.fmancialpost.com/news/storv.html?id=790965 
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scattered throughout the spectrum the financial system and the various institutions did 
not know where they were. 
Banks in Europe were immediately affected by their exposure to US financial 
markets. On October 8, the United Kingdom government again capitalized eight 
banks in the country, while on October 15th followed an agreement between the 
eurozone countries to finance further troubled banks and provide interbank guarantees 
loans (Naude,2009). It is obvious that the causes that led to this situation and helped 
to keep it going and swelling was deeper and bigger degree was due to market 
rigidities and of a structural nature omissions and oversights.  
 
1.2 The Causes of Financial Crisis 
 
There is generally agreement among analysts that four are the main categories of 
factors considered to be contributed to the creation of the Finance Crisis 2008: 
Α) Global macroeconomic imbalances: 
Over the last thirty years, China has achieved one excellent economic growth through 
the exports of industrial goods in the US. These exports have led to huge China's trade 
surpluses, surpluses which, however, did not feed the domestic demand, but placed in 
bonds US and other US dollar securities kept the dollar at relatively high levels on the 
contrary, US lending rates in relatively low levels. This development has led in 
strengthening liquidity and lending in the United States but also in its containment 
inflation. For their own reasons neither the European Union (problems 
competitiveness), nor Japan (low domestic demand) were able to intervene dissuasive. 
B) Excessive Credit Expansion and Leverage: 
The last fifteen years of credit expansion in the US and most developed economies 
has been impressive, not only from the relatively large increase of the monetary base, 
but also by the incredible leverage inside and outside of balance sheets of credit 
institutions and notably investment banks and hedge funds. This leverage, as in others 
financial crises, he mortgaged financial stability and left it system exposed to 
systemic risks. 
       Annex 1: Deficit/Surplus of Current Accounts Transactions % of GDP 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2014
Development Economies -0,90% -1,30% -0,70% -0,40% -0,30%
U.S.A 5,20% -4,90% -2,60% -2,20% -2,70%
Eurozone 0,30% -0,70% -0,70% -0,30% 0,50%
E.U -0,50% -1,10% -0,80% -0,50% n.a
Brazil 0,10% -1,80% -1,30% -1,90% -0,80%
Russia 5,90% 6,10% 3,60% 4,50% 2,90%
India -1,00% -2,20% -2,20% -2,50% -1,80%
China 11,00% 9,80% 7,80% 8,60% 8,40%
Japan 4,80% 3,20% 1,90% 2,00% 1,50%
Greece -14,20% -14,40% -10,00% -9,00% -6,80%
Defict/Surplus of Current Accounts Transactions % of GDP
Sources
IMF, World Economic Outlook Oct. 09/ E.U: European Commision: 
European Economic Forecast Nov 09
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C) Asymmetric Information and Problems Authorizing officer:  
The existence of asymmetry information on structured products (CDOs - 
Collateralized Debt Obligations, CDSs Credit Default Swaps, etc.) provided the 
opportunity their publishers to undertake excessive risk in an opaque way, risk which 
was not invoiced properly nor was adequately compensate At the same time, their pay 
systems commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies and hedge funds 
were not characterized by compatibility incentives between the strains and them 
shareholders of their companies, as a result also to take excessive risks by people who 
would not have the costs of their failed choices. 
D)Regulatory gaps and incomplete supervision: 
From 1999 onwards, both in the US and other countries was an aversion, which he 
had political-ideological background, in the implementation (mainly by the Fed and 
SEC) regulators measures with regard to its risk uncontrolled credit expansion and 
leverage. At the same time, the financial innovations, among them including those 
mentioned above, quickly created new markets without but be accompanied by the 
appropriate one’s accounting rules and the corresponding regulatory and supervisory 
framework. 
Now we know the coexistence of these four reasons was something like the story of 
the well-known work "The Perfect Storm ". Undoubtedly, its consequences 
coexistence has had multiple effects of those that would have each cause alone. So, 
the result of this coexistence was a series of huge bubbles in various natural and 
financial capital (real estate, commodities, shares, derivatives). 
“Bubble" in the market of a real or financial capital is one a situation where the price 
of that good is not explained by rational economic forces. Although the economists 
cannot predict when it breaks a bubble, it is lawful, that all the bubbles Sometimes 
they break. 
 
1.3 Financial Crisis and Financial System 
 
Financial institutions play a decisive role in the economy, contributing to its smooth 
functioning. This is due to the fact that they help address the problems of reverse 
choice and moral hazard in the financial market. More specifically, the banking 
system ensures minimization of the phenomenon of Free Rider through: 
 
• Τhe acquisition of information and their exploitation to make profits. 
• Τhe choice of borrowing after evaluating the best businesses. 
• The supervision of borrowing companies. 
 
Financial institutions are indissolubly linked to the course of the economy as a whole, 
making them liable to a significant extent for the economic course, but at the same 
time vulnerable to times of crisis due to specific features (Gavin, Hausmann,1998)  
 
• Τhe high leverage of banks as a result of their activity. 
• Τhe reduced liquidity. due to large discrepancies in lending and deposits 
and inadequate matching of their likelihood. 
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• Τhe creditworthiness and confidence enjoyed by a banking organization 
and the whole sector in the market. 
• Τhe risk of the mass withdrawal of capital from the banking system in 
times of crisis and the coverage of deposits by the state. 
• Τhe regulatory framework to which banking institutions are subject and the 
weaknesses of the supervisory bodies. 
 
Recent financial crisis of 2001 reduces the liquidity of major financial institutions and 
central banks support public sector banks by injecting the liquidity in the system. 
However, this strategy did not increase growth in the credit, but it increases hoarding 
of cash by financial institutions for covering their huge losses such as Federal reserve 
inject in the financial system, but it did not lead towards stimulation of credit in the 
economy (Cornett et al. 2010) 
 
1.4 The impact of financial crisis in the Greek banking sector 
For the Greek economy, the global financial crisis has been the cause of the debt crisis. 
Although the world economy showed the first signs of recovery in the first quarters of 
2010, the Greek market is still suffering from negative growth rates, rising interest rates 
borrowing and declining economic activity that led to it Greek State in its membership 
of the International Support Facility Monetary Fund. 
In this unfavorable environment, Greek banks could not remain unaffected by this 
crisis. In particular, banks are invited to operate in an environment with major 
challenges, such as the further reduction in growth rates, the possibility of raising loans 
to delays and difficulties in the money and capital markets. The above require concerted 
efforts by international organizations, governments and governments central banks to 
deal with the crisis. The organizations most affected by the crisis were concerned real 
estate exploitation, without missing problems in banking or insurance services. The real 
problems of the crisis broke into Greek economy, with rising interest rates and 
conservatism financial system to affect borrowers, small and medium-sized enterprises, 
consumer buying behavior and other aspects of the market, with direct impact on the 
economy. 
To ensure the stability of the banking system and the to prevent crises, it is necessary 
to adopt a series of preventive measures, as well as intrusive and protective 
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mechanisms. Total of these measures and mechanisms constitute the "Protective net 
banking system » 2 
The Greek banks, despite being indifferent to their initial stages crisis, on the one hand, 
due to their low exposure to toxic products, and on the other due to the comparatively 
smaller financial exposure to the European one average as a result of the lower loan-to-
deposit ratio, ultimately have entered a long period of exclusion from the international 
capital markets. This unprecedented development has had a negative consequence in 
their operation and even threatened their survival after five years (2002-2007) where 
the Greek banks were developing rapidly, both at a geographic level with the mainly in 
Southeastern Europe, as well as in a product level with their entry into new markets for 
financial products.3  
One of the factors that influenced their success was the wholesale financing. It is a fact 
that the funding of the Greek banks from the markets followed a positive course, 
starting from 1999, they set a convergence path with the average of European sizes 
banks. The possibilities for raising medium-term liquidity were strengthened as the 
markets knew Greek credit risk. 4  
Another qualitative feature of the form of funding of Greek banks was their access to 
easy, fast and cheap lending from other banks at 60% and from Central and North 
investors Europe accounts for 70% of their wholesale funding. Their success at a 
particular investment audience has thrown them to almost all of them investors with 
similar characteristics. 
With a delay, all major Greek banks took over initiatives to diversify their investment 
base towards new markets and new products. More specifically, they began to examine 
international proposals businesses to enter the American market, to attract certified 
investors. The initial hesitation of the banks for the activating themselves as foreign 
publishers to more rigorous, controlled and accurate borrowing markets outside Europe 
declined when European markets appeared signs of saturation, defining the absorption 
capacity of Greek state and bank bonds and expanding their credit margins in 2007. 5 
                                                          
2 Gortzos,Ch, Bank environment: Bank Law, Patra, Greek Open University 
 
3 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
 
4 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
5 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
11 
 
 
However, in the autumn of 2007 with the diffusion of market problems of US mortgage 
loans on the capital markets, markets showed signs of introversion, as investors' 
confidence hit with to avoid taking credit outside the borders of their country. A 
consequence of the collapse of the structured market financing was the postponement 
of all securitizations, resulting in discourage self-financing of assets.6 
In early 2008, in their attempt to return to traditional financing markets, Greek banks 
faced difficulties, since confidence among credit institutions was at a low level due to 
of the uncertainty about their robustness. The interbank market was almost, and the 
only available short-term sources of funding were borrowing repos and trading notes. 
In the medium term, private placements could not make up for the funding gap, with 
banks are turning to debt issues in the form of loans. He innovation prevailed because 
investors ranked them in the category "Loans and requirements "and therefore avoided 
valuing them at a time with increased volatility in securities. 
The expansive policy of Greek banks in Southeastern Europe continued at the same 
pace and absorbed much of the stock of their cash to serve needs such as 
• Asset pooling of subsidiaries' banks and the allocation of mandatory reserves 
to local central banks, 
• Regular capital support, and 
• The ongoing coverage of operating costs. 
 This triptych was sometimes accompanied by a forced conversion of euro to local 
currency of each country, resulting in a liquidity commitment in countries with several 
problems in the functioning of the financial markets. Therefore, 65% of their assets 
were, on average, financed by the parent bank in Greece through a fully centralized 
process that focused to traditional investors in Europe. 
Then is Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, reversing data in markets. 
This accelerates action by the supervisory authorities, which up to that point seemed to 
believe in process of self-regulation and avoided interference with capital markets. 
Interest rates on interbank markets incorporate credit risk counterparty, departing from 
the European interest rate Central Bank. Gradually the interbank market becomes 
inactive, while the bond issues are postponed7.  
                                                          
 
6 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
7 Union of Greek Banks “Greek Bank System 2010” June 
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Amid these developments, depositors-investors are losing out confidence in the 
banking system. Banks are defending deposits with a significant increase in their 
margins amid continuous releases of the key interest rate of the European Central Bank, 
which aims at alleviating borrowed from the basic cost of financing. All over Europe 
looking for ways to secure retail deposits. 8  
Initially the problem is handled with state guarantees of a certain amount per depositor, 
in order to avoid mass evasion of deposits. After all it is decided to establish programs 
to support and strengthen the economies liquidity of banks by governments, which take 
the form of government guarantees to banks, both in terms of capital and funding. 
Banks incorporate guarantees in new versions in order to remove investors' doubts and 
reduce borrowing costs. Against Consequently, structured bond markets (such as 
securitizations), such as unsecured bond markets and high-risk bond markets remain 
inactive until 2009. Then, with the successful announcement of results from banks 
globally, expectations for lifting it uncertainty and normalization are renewed. 
Greek banks are stepping up their efforts for her attracting deposits as the only credible 
source of funding. The new deposit margins range for the first time at levels above 
1.50%. At the same time, they accelerate their securitization of assets in order to present 
them as a pledge to the European Central Bank and freeze any development and 
investment plans. In its field wholesale markets, markets become inhospitable for Greek 
banks despite the guarantees of the state, due to low credit rating. Thus, we have a 
significant increase in credit risk 9. 
Meanwhile the European Central Bank, trying to revive the interbank market, launches 
a supply period liquidity up to one year in mid-2009. Surprisingly, its strong appeal 
confirms pessimistic estimates of poor performance financial markets and the 
expectation that margins will not deviate further. In order to facilitate the lending of 
banks, European Central Bank promotes the relaxation of eligibility criteria of the 
pledges to allow a number of low pledges credit ratings are accepted in its tanks. 
The borrowing of European banks by the European Central Bank has been declining 
since the end of 2009, as its lending rate European Central Bank is no longer so 
attractive compared to the benchmark rates on the interbank market, while at the same 
time, it is observed easing their obligations due to deletion of their balance sheet. By contrast, 
Greek banks' lending is rising due to the need refinancing of older maturing bonds as well as 
                                                          
8 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
9 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
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investment choices resulting from their increased participation in its publications of the 
Greek State.  
The fact is that the Greek banks depend on the ECB at the beginning of 2010 exceeds 
the tolerable limits compared to their size, receives reviews from analysts, supervisors 
and credit houses assessment. At the same time, the Greek economy is entering new 
adventures with revealing a huge fiscal problem. This fact was the beginning of a series 
of unfavorable developments for Greek banks, dictating the redesign of provisions. The 
final one Liquidity cuts in the Greek banking system are leading to strong growth 
competition to attract client deposits. The majority of them of liabilities of Greek banks 
(balances of accounts, futures, repos and interbank lending) is adversely affected, 
proving that the tanks are linked. Foreign banks they close the funding lines, but also 
the credit limits for the whole of financial products with Greek banks and require a lot 
high collateral for maintaining their exposure in Greece. Even the ones liquidity 
reserves in Southeast Europe is not feasible to repatriated due to commitments to local 
governments and the International Monetary Fund. 
The international community is concerned about the viability of the bank system in 
Greece, since it is characterized by particularly high costs financing, such as deposits, 
and inherent inability to de-leverage. This fact, coupled with a series of downgrades 
from the houses credit rating, leads investors to flee. The plans of Greek banks are 
overthrown and led to full dependence on the Greek banks European Central Bank for 
the entire financing, by vehicle Greek State guarantees for which there is favorable 
treatment from the European Central Bank. Liquidation of assets is only possible in 
highly diversified loan portfolios and if not have a correlation with Greece. 
Traditionally, however, they occupy little share in the balance sheet of Greek banks. 
The situation seems to be is out of control when it comes to bankruptcy or restructuring 
public debt of the country, resulting in the definitive escape of deposits to the external 
and the decline of deposits in the subsidiary banks of Greek groups in Southeastern 
Europe. 
Now, the course of Greek banks is in line with developments the economic and financial 
issues that plague Greece. The Greek banks are now able to turn only to the Europeans 
Central Bank, which is increasingly burdened with funding banks from the weak 
economies of Europe. Establishing one a series of measures to save the economies of 
Europe in mid-2010 slows the surge of capital flight. For Greece, the measures put it on 
country in indirect protection from creditors, but they also raise doubts about it if the grace 
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period and fiscal measures can help the Greek economy and help restore it to the 
markets. The escalation of these measures through the acceptance of Greek government 
bonds by the European Central Bank independently credit rating, ensures the 
sufficiency of the Greek pledges banking system. Greek banks are increasing their 
dependence on the European Central Bank and the ominous predictions of analysts for 
failure to finance outside the European Central Bank is evolving in self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
This trend is prevailing to date and does not seem to change directly. Indicative is that 
the total borrowing of Greek banks by the European Central Bank reaches 95 billion 
euros in early 2011 versus EUR 50 billion at the end of 2009. Dependence on the 
European Central Bank now covers 18% of the Greek banks' assets compared with 3% 
for all banks in Europe. The situation is still happening more difficult with the ranking 
of Greece and, by extension, Greek banks, in the category of unclassified junk most 
credit rating agencies. Downgrades have impact and funding through the European 
Central Bank with two ways. Firstly, the valuation of Greek pledges in the European 
Central Bank worsens and secondly, haircuts stagger. This one reality presses further 
their balance sheets, because it leads to a significant financing gap and, on the other 
hand, exacerbates the tactical problem replenishing the amount of pledges required to 
be reserved for adequate coverage of the nominal amount of borrowing by the European 
Central Bank 10 
 
1.5 Ways of Central Crisis Response to the World Financial System 
The international community, in the 2008 crisis, reacted in a coordinated fashion 
intervention that have sought to mitigate and reduce the shocks adverse effects on the 
real economy11  
Αlmost all countries reacted with a reduction in interest rates and efforts to do so 
increased liquidity, through guarantees given to banks, for strengthening their capital 
base and removing them devaluated assets. At the same time, measures have been 
implemented expansionary fiscal policy to boost business. The crisis has highlighted, 
among other things, its inadequate management procedures liquidity and bank 
exposures worldwide. The danger liquidity has fled the regulatory framework 
                                                          
10 Michalopoulos,G “Financing Greek Banks during crisis” Alpha Bank,2011 
11 Provopoulos,G 2009 “The two Global Crisis and The Greek Economy” presentation at the Conference of the Hellenic 
Parliament Foundation for the Parliamentary and Democracy 12/11/2009 
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internationally, unlike the market risk and credit risk under strict supervision. They are 
indicating that operational and potential liquidity ratios as well medium-term finance 
for assets were rarely announced and were analyzed by the banks because, in any case, 
they considered the retention liquidity surplus constitutes a premium that significantly 
net interest margin. At the same time, international regulators have provided particular 
flexibility in credit institutions in terms of the asset structure; and liabilities, as the 
perception that large banks were fairly well established mature to protect themselves. 
This fact is one a major failure of the financial system to detect, yes process, measure 
and address liquidity risks; and financing. Indeed, the crisis taught that the range of 
risks in financing of banks, which may result from combinations of events and 
developments, was largely underestimated. The stability of the international financial 
system has come under questioning at the peak of the crisis.12 
 More in particular, there was a serious risk of its collapse. One way of surveillance 
under the current global crisis, solutions are being sought at national and international 
level, which will be the trigger for it reverse the unfavorable climate and help the 
economy get into developmental trajectory. The initiatives taken so far at international 
level since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, include rescue packages, warranty and 
banking system security, undervalued redemption programs bank balance sheet data, as 
well as corporate purchase bonds from state governments in an attempt to come back 
confidence and a smooth flow of capital into the market. The new rules are aimed at 
strengthening the world financial system and its more efficient operation. Many argue 
that greater control will mean an increase in functionality costs for banks and limiting 
their ability to provide loans in businesses and households. The initiatives to date have 
been to provide liquidity to the market, facilities to financial institutions, as well as state 
and local markets corporate bonds while balancing the pressures that it is taking 
financing of states and large enterprises. It is also worth to it is reported that over the 
last few years many governments have recruited government intervention in order to 
protect their domestic products and preserve jobs. 
In order to strengthen the banking system, we need the Community institutions to take 
forward international initiatives to strengthen the regulatory environment frame. These 
initiatives are particularly relevant13  
                                                          
12 Chardouvelis, G.A 2009, “The financial crisis and the future of world economy”, Eurobank EFG Economic Research: The 
crisis 2007-2009: The Causes, Treatment and Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 19-43. 
13 Hellenic Bank Association, (2010), "The Greek banking system in 2009" Athens 
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• Strengthening the regulatory framework governing capital, the adequacy of 
credit institutions, such as the Covenant of the Basle Committee (Basel III). 
• The revision of the remuneration of directors of listed companies, 
• The revision of the regulatory framework for its misuse market, with the 
main aim of extending their scope its provisions and in unregulated markets 
until now, 
• The assignment of Rating Bodies to a specific regulatory body; and 
supervisory framework, 
• Strengthening the regulatory framework governing their transparency 
capital market and risk management; and 
• The reform of the European supervision framework financial system. 
At the end of 2010, the European Parliament and the Council adopted three Regulations 
with which the three so called "European Supervisory Authorities" for the enhancing 
the effectiveness of micro-prudential oversight of operator’s financial services in the 
European Union 14. The European Banking Authority (EBA) under Regulation (EC) 
1093/20102 
• The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority ("European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority "or" EIOPA "), under the Of 
Regulation (EC) 1094/20103 and 
• the European Securities and Markets Authority ("European Securities and 
Markets") Markets Authority "or" ESMA ") under Regulation (EC) 1095/2010. 
In recent years, banks have been granted state guarantees, and in particular 
government bonds for the purpose of raising liquidity from the European Central Bank 
Bank. At the same time, the State has strengthened its capital adequacy banks with 
issuance and delivery to special bond banks against the State has preferential shares of 
banks at an annual cost of 10% for banks. The capital adequacy of Greek banks is 
satisfactory, despite the important predictions they have already made to deal with the 
unavoidable increase in bad and non-performing loans. This because the shareholders 
of the banks contributed decisively to the capital payments made since 2009. 
                                                          
14 Association of Greek Banks, (2011), "The Greek banking system in 2010" June 
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On top of all this, Greece’s debt, even under the International Monetary Fund’s mild 
assumptions, is on a non-convergent path even with the perceived “austerity” 
measures.  Bubble math is easy.  Hide all the names and just look at the numbers.  If 
debt looks as if it will explode as a percent of G.D.P., then a spectacular collapse is in 
the cards. ( Boone P.-Johnson S. 2010) 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAPITAL ADEQUANCY OF BANKS 
2.1 Definition of capital adequacy 
The prices of financial instruments have fluctuated significantly resulting in the 
volatility of the market value of bank capital. As a result, the need for a commonly 
agreed capital adequacy framework that would weaken the capital base and facilitate 
comparability at international level. The "Basle Committee" (centered in the Bank for 
International Settlements), which was originally established in 1974, is a committee 
that represents central banks and financial supervisory authorities of the major 
industrialized countries (the G10 countries). The committee concerns itself with 
ensuring the effective supervision of banks on a global basis by setting and promoting 
international standards. Its principal interest has been in the area of capital adequacy 
ratios. In 1988 the committee issued a statement of principles dealing with capital 
adequacy ratios. This statement is known as the "Basle Capital Accord". It contains a 
recommended approach for calculating capital adequacy ratios and recommended 
minimum capital adequacy ratios for international banks. The Accord was developed 
in order to improve capital adequacy ratios (which were considered to be too low in 
some banks) and to help standardize international regulatory practice. It has been 
adopted by the OECD countries and many developing countries 
 
2.2 Banking Capital Basis 
In general, we can distinguish three different concepts of capital: 
• Accounting funds: funds that are shown in the balance sheet and based on 
internationally accepted accounting rules. 
• Supervisory capital: the funds the same as under the prudential rules. 
• Capital at risk or financial funds: the funds needed to absorb unexpected losses per 
the risks it faces bank. 
The multiple concepts of capital that in the banking sector are due to the heterogeneity 
of the factors financial data of a bank (stakeholders). We can discern five groups of 
factors: bond- the depositors, the shareholders, the rating and supervisory authorities. 
Each group focuses on different points of analysis, as it has preferences and aspirations 
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that differ their behavior in relation to them other groups as well as the ability 
influencing the bank's decisions. 
Bondholders and rating companies, which theoretically represent possible bondholders, 
are mainly interested in it probability of bankruptcy of the bank, so evaluate any new 
information with this prism. Applicants, to the extent that their positions are protected 
by a system guarantee schemes have little incentive diversifying their behavior and 
usually their actions are modeled with based on the liquidity incentive. Shareholders 
from the other side focuses their attention wealth creation and secondarily the 
probability of bankruptcy. They are interested taking greater risk, as long as it is 
rewarded for it. Their behavior is made possible by the possibility of profitability, that 
is to maximize them cash flows of the bank under no circumstances bankruptcy. Finally, 
the actions of supervisor’s authorities shall be guided by the maximum of social well-
being. These principles have the potential to gather information from on-the-spot 
checks and which it is required to submit banks, as well as the possibility disciplinary 
sanctions. The key risk factor which making their decisions is the possibility bankruptcy 
which creates systemic missile. Preventive intervention is targeted to reduce the 
likelihood of bankruptcy, while suppressive intervention to prevent it crisis 
transmission to robust banks. Co- how, the aspirations of the supervisors are closer to 
bondholders and to depositors rather than shareholders. 
2.3 ACCOUNTING CAPITAL 
Accounting chapters are important factor in managing a bank, because they signify its 
robustness as well and the degree of protection of its depositors. The accounting 
chapters are drawn up with International Financial Reporting Standards. Information 
System (IFRS), where three basic elements of the the share capital, the various thematic 
and winnings. The equity capital consists of the paid share capital and the difference 
from issuance of shares above par. The stock- are formed based on the profits of the in 
order to deal with the various assets, mainly lending and investment inn securities. The 
accounting of them reserves depends on the way in which of the balance sheet items, 
which must be included in one of them next categories15:  
(a) held to maturity maturity - HTM) 
(b) Loans and receivables - L & R) 
(c) Valued at fair value through profit or loss fair value through profit and loss -FVTPL) 
                                                          
15 The bulk of the capital adequacy of the banks” Financial Report Bank of Greece, Issue 36, April 2012, pages 47-95 
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(d) Available for sale - AFS). 
Each category reflects the different the purpose of holding each item and different 
valuation. The information the bank intends to hold until maturity is sorted in the HTM 
portfolio, while the loans, the deposits, etc. in the L & R portfolio. And the two 
portfolios are valued at the cost, that is, the cost of acquisition minus accumulated 
depreciation less any impairments. Value impairments (provisions) mainly concern 
portfolio credit facility. 
The category "Valued at fair value Through Results "(FVTPL) has two sub- categories, 
items for sale in a short period of exploitation price fluctuations (held for trading - HFT) 
and the data that the bank has say at the time of initial recognition to be valued at fair 
value.8 In both adjustments from valuation the results of the bank. Finally, the portfolio 
"Available to sale "(AFS) contains items that predefined as available to sale and are 
measured at fair value, but the adjustment from the valuation is directly attributable to 
equity, changes in the reserve available-for-sale securities. This continues until the sale 
of the items, so the accumulated profit or loss has been recognized in equity is recorded 
in a profit and loss account. 
2.4 SUSTAINABILITY OF SUPERVISORY CAPITAL 
To understand the supervisory dimension of the funds, we must distinguish between 
available capital (available capital) and required funds capital). The funds available are 
funds that a bank is based on prudential rules, while the required funds are the funds 
that should be to have a bank based on the risk- mindsets and entrepreneurship of the 
plan. If the funds available are larger than required, the bank is considered sufficiently 
capitalized. The cross- the available funds and funds required funds also identifies form 
that management has to take funds in a bank. Let's look at it each form of funds 
separately: 
A) CAPITAL AVAILABLE 
In order to include a financial, the available funds, it must meet the following 
properties: 
• Permanence, i.e. the funds provided from the financial instrument to be permanently 
and available when needed. This is in principle intertwined with the if it is one 
average, the more time a bank may be based on the relevant chapters. At the same time, 
there must be none (whether contractual or otherwise) of the issuer's liability for early 
repayment (e.g. clause), but even if it exists, that should not provide a strong incentive 
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to payment. Based on the above, the equity capital, which extends to perpetuity, is better 
quality than a time limit. subordinated debt. 
• Flexibility, i.e. issuer of the financial instrument to has the ability to cancel payments 
(interest or dividends) based on current financial conditions. Or this feature is usually 
given in dividends of shares or preference shares, as it is at the discretion of the the 
decision to distribute a dividend, but flexibility is mitigated if the privileges shares have 
a cumulative right dividend. On the contrary, for bonds reduced guaranteeing the 
possibility of coupon is much more limited. 
• Ability to absorb losses, i.e. Coverage capability losses to keep the bank in going 
concern or to protect the depositors in case of entry in divestiture proceedings. With 
based on the loss absorption criterion, share capital is the first in the in terms of quality, 
since it can directly absorb losses without anyone restriction. On the contrary, bonds 
decreased collateral is lower in ranking, since they do not have much capacity to absorb 
damage in operating conditions, while possibility is improved in after the holders are 
satisfied before the common shareholders. 
Based on the degree of satisfaction of the three above characteristics, supervisor funds 
are divided into three categories of quality, Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3. Each category is 
further divided into upper and lower chapters. 
a) Equity Funds 
The main Equity Funds are in compliance with IFRS funds and include the share 
capital, reserves and minority rights. All the above is recognized in the banking sector 
system is clearly reflected in the public available balance sheets are significant impact 
on efficiency and cover the three characteristics of the funds. Therefore, the Equity 
Funds are considered to be the best quality. 
Core Equity Funding in many cases is difficult or expensive, and the supervisory 
authorities have broadened the definition of Basic Equity by including hybrid 
securities, called "Additional Basic Capital". Hybrid securities are titles that share 
some common features with stocks (for example, they extend into perpetuity) 
certain common features with bonds (e.g. payment of fixed interest). Essentially the 
holder of a hybrid title exchanges claims on him capital with fixed payments from the 
bank's profits. There are three forms of hybrid securities, innovative titles, non-
innovative securities and preferred stocks. 
Hybrids are often issued through a special purpose vehicle and used as a means of 
raising capital, but the framework puts down some quantitative restrictions, for 
example, they must not exceed 15% of the Basic Capital. During the 
credit crisis 2007-08 many hybrid securities have been downgraded by rating agencies 
and have significantly lost their ability to absorb losses. 
b) Supplementary Funds 
Supplementary Equity includes preference shares with equity 
cumulative dividend, subordinated debt and positive difference 
22 
 
accounting estimates and expected loss. For the latter it is noted that if the amount of 
the provisions exceeds the expected loss, then the difference must be regarded as 
available capital and is classified in the Supplementary Funds, with a limit not 
exceeding 0.6% of the weighted assets. Of course, this possibility is only available to 
banks that apply the Basel II Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB), as they are 
considered to have a credible way of calculating expected loss. 
c) Removals 
In order to arrive at the total available funds, some are deducted which do not meet 
the criteria set. From Basic Equity the intangible assets are deducted, as they cannot 
be converted to tangible to absorb losses, as well as own shares, because with 
purchase the bank transferred the loss absorption capacity from the original buyer of 
the shares in the same. Also, fair value revaluation reserves do not include positive or 
negative differences in value of non-interest-bearing products (e.g. shares). The logic 
is that for non-interest-bearing products, which extend over time, the valuation loss 
must be assumed, and therefore deducted, from the Equity Funds. The same applies to 
gains from valuation, but this is included, by 45%, in Supplementary Funds. As for 
interest rate products (e.g. bonds), they have a specific maturity and any valuation loss 
is not a good approximation of the potential loss, hence remains in the reserves. Only 
in case of bankruptcy issuer, the damage must be assumed and deducted. 
Furthermore, some of the necessary adjustments are made to total own funds, 
in order to deduct data that does not have a good absorption capacity. 
Again, the analysis is not exhaustive, and we will refer to some typical cases: 
- The negative difference between accounting forecasts and expected is deducted, loss 
of 50% of Basic Equity and 50% of Supplementary Equity. 
- A Bank A's participation (shares or hybrids) in a B bank is deducted if the holding 
exceeds 10% of B's capital, 50% of Basic Equity and 50% of Supplementary Equity. 
The logic is to avoid double gearing, since if the deduction was not applicable, banks 
A and B could help each other to increase their capital base without a real inflow of 
capital. 
- A bank's total holding capital is deducted from participation in an insurance 
company if the holding exceeds 20% of the capital of the insurance company. 
 
 
B) REQUIRED CAPITAL 
For the total available funds, the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) as: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
𝐴𝐶
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
> 8% 
 
Where: 
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio 
AC: Available Capital 
 
If the CAR ≥ 8%, the bank is considered to be sufficiently capitalized, 15 in the sense 
that its available capital covers the possible losses that may arise from the credit risk, 
the market risk and the operational risk it has assumed. 
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However, in specific circumstances, for example in periods crisis, the additional funds 
do not significantly absorb the losses, with capital adequacy is mainly based on core 
capital. In these are the Baseline Indicators: 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘+𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
>4% 
 
It is noted that under the current supervisory framework its threshold above is set at 
4%. However, with Basel III the few rates are being adjusted. 
For the calculation of the denominator of the two fractions is followed risk weighting 
technique, through its calculation risk-weighted assets (RWA): 
 
𝑅𝑊𝐴 = 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑜𝑝𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝐴 = 𝑅𝑊 + 12.5
= (𝐴𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙) 
 
Where: 
AC: Available Capital 
A: value of assets 
RW: credit risk weight. 
So, to calculate the required funds - RC - with sufficient at least 8%, we have: 
 
𝑅𝐶
𝑅𝑊𝐴
= 8% → 𝑅𝐶 = 𝐴 = 𝑅𝑊 = 8% 
 
 
Annex 2-Capital Ratios 
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2.5. Financial Capital 
The supervisory funds we have just mentioned concern the minimum funds that need to be 
available to cover credit, operational and market risks as defined and calculated under some 
supervisory rules. However, a financial institution faces a wider range of risks, which is 
required to map, analyze ways of estimating them, levels of acceptance, timing, and estimate 
the funds needed to cover them. These are the financial funds of the bank. 
A portfolio of exposures breaks down the losses based on two factors: 
• The frequency of the damage 
• Their intensity when they take place. 
It is important to distinguish the damage in three categories: 
• In the expected, referring to losses of its daily operation bank when exposed to 
normal foreign conditions environment and to normal and expected risks, 
• The unexpected, resulting from his unexpected events financial environment that 
may arise lead to damage and 
• In extreme damage, resulting from extreme events that cannot be predicted on 
the basis of known risk assessment models. 
The distribution resulting from the combination of the above parameters presents all future 
losses weighted by the probability of occurrence depending on the characteristics of each risk. 
The combination of all of them of the possible losses of any type of damage constitutes the 
total loss for a credit institution. It is noted that it is particularly difficult calculation of the 
combination of individual risks into a single allocation. It should also be mentioned that the 
expected loss is determined by the means of distribution, while the unexpected loss and 
stressed loss are determined by the variance and the confidence interval. The calculation of 
the total loss allocation of the financial capital is made using the Value at Risk (VaR) model 
 
 
Annex 3-Value at Risk 
 
. 
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2.6 Analysis of risks contributing to the calculation of capital adequacy 
2.6.1 Credit Risk 
Credit risk is defined as the probable or expected loss resulting from the inability of 
borrowers to repay the funds and / or interest on the borrowed funds, that is, the 
inability to meet their contractual obligations. Credit risk exists in any form of 
placement or investment of the bank, be it some type of finance or purchase of 
securities and financial instruments. Because of credit risk or credit risk loss, as is the 
case with any other risk, it is the change in the net equity of the bank or the value of 
the portfolio. The Bank's mediation in the process contributes both to the ease of the 
transfer of funds and to the reduction of the overall credit risk. If the transfer of funds 
was carried out directly from the surplus to the deficit, the former would also take on 
the risk of the latter being unable to fulfill their obligations and mainly by the inability 
to repay the funds they had raised. With the intervention of the bank, the process 
changes and the risk varies. Surplus units deposit their capital with the bank, 
minimizing the risk of non-repayment, as banks are organizations operating under 
certain capital adequacy rules, constantly controlled by the supervisory authorities in 
many ways, and follow in the process of financing specific rules, such as rules for big 
ones 
exposures, exposures, and so on. Banks, in turn, investing depositors' funds, 
themselves take the risk of not returning the funds they transfer to the final borrowers 
through their investments, i.e. through loans, loans of all kinds or the purchase of 
securities and securities. Since the bank is an organized and specialized financial 
institution, it can assess the solvency of the borrowers and take appropriate measures 
such as collateral or monitoring measures, resulting in overall credit risk being 
significantly reduced in relation to risk for the very same investment in direct capital 
transfer. 
In Summary:  
• The bank assumes the risk that the depositors or holders of the funds would 
take if it did not intervene. 
• With the mediation process, the overall credit risk decreases, i.e. if: 
Cr1 = Credit risk of direct financing 
Cr2 = Credit risk of depositors or creditors of the bank 
Cr3 = Credit risk of a bank 
Then: (Cr2 + Cr3) <Cr1 
• Credit risk exists both in loans (financing) and in other investments. (As 
elsewhere, both the investment portfolio and the trading portfolio involve other 
risks.) 
The basic methods for measuring credit risk are two: 
• The Credit Scoring method for financing individuals, professionals and small 
businesses. 
• The Credit Rating method for large business financing or placements in 
business titles. 
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2.6.2 Market Risk 
Market risk refers to the risk that an investment may face due to fluctuations in the 
market. The risk is that the investment’s value will decrease. Also known as 
systematic risk, the term may also refer to a specific currency or commodity. 
Market risk is generally expresses in annualized terms. Either as fraction of the initial 
value (e.g. 6%) or an absolute number (e.g. $6). 
Market risk contrasts with specific risk, also known as business risk or unsystematic 
risk, which is tied directly with a market sector or the performance of a particular 
company. In other words, market risk refers to the overall economy or securities 
markets, while specific risk involves only a part. 
There are several standard market risk factors, including: 
– Equity Risk: the risk that share prices will change. 
– Commodity Risk: the likelihood that a commodity price, such as that of a metal or 
grain, will change. 
– Currency Risk: the probability that foreign exchange rates will change. 
– Interest Rate Risk: the risk that interest rates will go up or down. 
– Inflation Risk: the risk that overall rises in prices of goods and services will 
undermine the value of money, and probably adversely impact the value of 
investments. 
According to the Bank of England, the relevant variables are “primarily interest rates, 
exchange rates, and the spreads between the yields of securities issued by sovereigns 
and by other types of issuer.” 
Diversification and market risk 
Risk can be reduced to some extent if you diversify your investments, i.e. widen your 
portfolio. However, it is impossible to eliminate all risks. 
Some market risks are not possible to prevent or foresee. Natural disasters, such as 
hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes can strike at any time and may affect 
the value of your investments. 
Other sources of market risk include terrorist attacks, political instability, 
recessions, and trade embargoes. 
According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (America’s 
central bank): 
“Market risk encompasses the risk of financial loss resulting from movements in 
market prices.” 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) defines market risk as the risk of losses on-
and-off balance sheet positions that occur as a result of adverse movements in market 
prices. “From a regulatory perspective, market risk stems from all the positions 
included in banks’ trading book as well as from commodity and foreign exchange risk 
positions in the whole balance sheet,” the EBA adds. 
The majority of investors know that investing comes with risks as well as rewards, 
and that, overall, the greater the risk, the bigger the potential reward. 
While it is vital to consider the risks in the context of a specific market or investment 
class, it is also just as important to consider marker risk. 
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Annex 4- Several economic factors contribute to market risk. 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a private corporation in the US that acts 
as a self-regulatory organization, has the following advice for investors: 
“Investments involve varying levels and types of risks. These risks can be associated 
with the specific investment, or with the marketplace as a whole. As you build and 
maintain your portfolio, remember that global events and other factors you cannot 
control can impact the value of your investments. And be sure to take both business 
risks and market risks into account.” 
2.6.3 Operational Risk 
Operational risk summarizes the risks a company undertakes when it attempts to 
operate within a given field or industry. Operational risk is the risk not inherent in 
financial, systematic or market-wide risk. It is the risk remaining after 
determining financing and systematic risk, and includes risks resulting 
from breakdowns in internal procedures, people and systems. 
Operational risk can be summarized as human risk; it is the risk of business operations 
failing due to human error. It changes from industry to industry, and is an important 
consideration to make when looking at potential investment decisions. Industries with 
lower human interaction are likely to have lower operational risk. 
Operational risk focuses on how things are accomplished within an organization and 
not necessarily what is produced or inherent within an industry. These risks are often 
associated with active decisions relating to how the organization functions and what it 
prioritizes. While the risks are not guaranteed to result in failure, lower production or 
higher overall costs, they are seen as higher or lower depending on various internal 
management decisions. 
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Examples of Operational Risks 
One area that may involve operational risk is the maintenance of necessary systems 
and equipment. If two maintenance activities are required, but it is determined only 
one can be afforded at the time, making the choice to perform one over the other 
alters the operational risk depending on which system is left in disrepair. If a system 
fails, the negative impact is associated directly with the operational risk. 
Other areas that qualify as operational risk tend to involve the human element within 
the organization. If a sales-oriented business chooses to maintain a subpar sales staff, 
due to its lower salary costs or any other factor, this is considered an operational risk. 
The same can be said for failing to properly staff to avoid certain risks. In 
manufacturing, choosing not to have a qualified mechanic on staff, and having to rely 
on third parties for that work, can be classified as an operational risk. Not only does 
this impact a system's operation, it also involves additional time delays as it relates to 
the third party. 
Willing participating in fraudulent activity may also be seen as operational risk. In 
this case, the risk involves the possibility of repercussions if the activity is uncovered. 
Since the decision is active, it is considered a risk relating to how the business 
operates. 
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                                         CHAPTER 3 
                                    BASEL COMMITTEE 
 
3.1 Basel Committee 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was founded in Basel at the 
end of 1974 and is located at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The 
Committee is made up of representatives of the central banks and banking supervisory 
authorities of 28 jurisdictions. (see Annex A for a presentation of all members). 
Switzerland is represented on the Committee by FINMA and the Swiss National Bank 
(the SNB). The Basel Committee is the world's most important standard-setting body 
for banking regulation and acts as a forum for collaboration to discuss banking 
supervision. Its main objective is to enhance banking supervision, thereby promoting 
financial stability. 
Annex 5 
 BCBS activities focus on exchanging information on national, banking-related 
supervisory issues, approaches and techniques. Based on that information, the BCBS 
develops banking guidelines and supervisory standards. The BCBS does not have any 
formal authority, and its decisions are not backed by legal force. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's work is organized under four main 
subcommittees: 
• The Standards Implementation Group was originally established to 
share information on, and promote consistency in, the implementation of 
the Basel II Framework. In 2009, the Standards Implementation Group's 
goals were broadened to concentrate on implementation of general Basel 
Committee guidance and standards. 
• The Policy Development Group identifies and reviews emerging 
supervisory issues. The Policy Development Group also proposes and 
develops policies designed to create sound banking systems and 
supervisory standards. 
• The Accounting Task Force helps ensure that international accounting 
and auditing standards and practices promote risk management at banks. 
The Accounting Task Force also develops reporting guidance and takes an 
active role in the development of these international accounting and 
auditing standards. 
• The Basel Consultative Group facilitates supervisory dialogue with non-member 
countries on new committee initiatives by engaging senior representatives from 
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various countries, international institutions and regional groups of banking 
supervisors that are not members of the committee. 
In 1988, the Commission introduced a capital measurement system called Basel 
Capital Accord. The supervisory framework of the international banking system, 
Basel I, was adopted in 1998. The objective was to address credit risk through the 
introduction of minimum capital requirements. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the Basel II framework, which replaced Basel I, aimed 
at providing a more complete picture of the risks borne by credit institutions and 
linking the capital requirements to those risks. Finally, under Basel III, regulatory 
standards are presented regarding the capital adequacy and liquidity of banks 
 
3.2 Basel I: the Basel Capital Accord 
With the foundations for supervision of internationally active banks laid, capital 
adequacy soon became the main focus of the Committee’s activities. In the early 
1980s, the onset of the Latin American debt crisis heightened the Committee’s 
concerns that the capital ratios of the main international banks were deteriorating at a 
time of growing international risks. Backed by the G10 Governors, Committee 
members resolved to halt the erosion of capital standards in their banking systems and 
to work towards greater convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. This 
resulted in a broad consensus on a weighted approach to the measurement of risk, 
both on and off banks’ balance sheets. There was strong recognition within the 
Committee of the overriding need for a multinational accord to strengthen the stability 
of the international banking system and to remove a source of competitive inequality 
arising from differences in national capital requirements. Following comments on a 
consultative paper published in December 1987, a capital measurement system 
commonly referred to as the Basel Capital Accord (1988 Accord) was approved by 
the G10 Governors and released to banks in July 1988. The 1988 Accord called for a 
minimum capital ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% to be implemented by 
the end of 1992. Ultimately, this framework was introduced not only in member 
countries but also in virtually all other countries with active international banks. In 
September 1993, the Committee issued a statement confirming that G10 countries’ 
banks with material international banking business were meeting the minimum 
requirements set out in the Accord. The Accord was always intended to evolve over 
time. It was amended first in November 1991. The 1991 amendment gave greater 
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precision to the definition of general provisions or general loan-loss reserves that 
could be included in the capital adequacy calculation. In April 1995, the Committee 
issued an amendment, to take effect at end-1995, to recognize the effects of bilateral 
netting of banks’ credit exposures in derivative products and to expand the matrix of 
add-on factors. In April 1996, another document was issued explaining how 
Committee members intended to recognize the effects of multilateral netting. The 
Committee also refined the framework to address risks other than credit risk, which 
was the focus of the 1988 Accord. In January 1996, following two consultative 
processes, the Committee issued the so-called Market Risk Amendment to the Capital 
Accord (or Market Risk Amendment), to take effect at the end of 1997. This was 
designed to incorporate within the Accord a capital requirement for the market risks 
arising from banks’ exposures to foreign exchange, traded debt securities, equities, 
commodities and options. An important aspect of the Market Risk Amendment was 
that banks were, for the first time, allowed to use internal models (value-at-risk 
models) as a basis for measuring their market risk capital requirements, subject to 
strict quantitative and qualitative standards. Much of the preparatory work for the 
market risk package was undertaken jointly with securities regulators. 
Why Basel 1 was needed? 
The reason was to create a level playing field for “internationally active banks” 
Banks from different countries competing for the same loans would have to set aside 
roughly the same amount of capital on the loans 
The purpose was: 
1) To prevent international banks from building business volume without 
adequate capital backing 
2) The focus was on credit risk 
3) Set minimum capital standards for banks 
4) Became effective at the end of 1992  
 
Basel-I was hailed for incorporating risk into the calculation of capital requirements 
 
The Cooke ratio: 
 
Named after Peter Cooke (Bank of England), the chairman of the Basel committee) 
 
Cooke Ratio=Capital/ Risk Weighted Assets≥8% 
 
Definition of Capital: 
   Capital= Core Capital + Supplementary Capital – Deductions 
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Basel 1-Capital Requirments: 
• Capital was set at 8% and was adjusted by a loan’s credit risk weight 
• Credit risk was divided into 5 categories:  0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100% 
– Commercial loans, for example, were assigned to the 100% risk weight 
category 
 
Calculation Of Required Capital 
• To calculate required capital, a bank would multiply the assets in each risk category 
by the category’s risk weight and then multiply the result by 8% 
– Thus a $100 commercial loan would be multiplied by 100% and 
then by 8%, resulting in a capital requirement of $8 
 
Core and Supplementary Capital 
 
1) Core Capital (Tier I Capital) 
        i) Paid Up Capital 
        ii) Disclosed Reserves (General and Legal Reserves) 
2) Supplementary Capital (Tier II Capital) 
        i)  General Loan-loss Provisions 
        ii) Undisclosed Reserves (other provisions against 
            probable losses) 
        iii) Asset Revaluation Reserves 
        iv) Subordinated Term Debt (5+ years maturity) 
        v) Hybrid (debt/equity) instruments 
 
DEDUCTIONS FROM THE CAPITAL 
• Investments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary companies and 
investments in the capital of other banks & financial institutions 
• Goodwill 
DEFINITION OF CAPITAL IN BASEL-I 
                     TIER 1 
• Paid-up share capital/common stock 
• Disclosed reserves (legal reserves, surplus and/or retained profits) 
TIER 2  
• Undisclosed reserves (bank has made a profit, but this has not appeared in normal 
retained profits or in general reserves of the bank.) 
• Asset revaluation reserves (when a company has an asset revalued and an increase in 
value is brought to account) 
• General Provisions (created when a company is aware that a loss may have occurred 
but is not sure of the exact nature of that loss) /General loan-loss reserves  
• Hybrid debt/equity instruments (such as preferred stock) 
• Subordinated debt 
 
RISK WEIGHT CATEGORIES IN BASEL-I 
0% Risk Weight:  
• Cash,  
• Claims on central governments and central banks denominated in national currency and 
funded in that currency 
• Other claims on OECD countries, central governments and central banks 
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• Claims collateralized by cash of OECD government securities or guaranteed by OECD 
Governments 
20% Risk Weight 
• Claims on multilateral development banks and claims guaranteed or collateralized by 
securities issued by such banks 
• Claims on, or guaranteed by, banks incorporated in the OECD 
• Claims on, or guaranteed by, banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with 
residual maturity of up to one year 
• Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities, excluding central government, 
and claims on guaranteed securities issued by such entities 
Cash items in the process of collection 
50 % Risk Weight 
• Loans fully securitized by mortgage on residential property that is or will be occupied 
by the borrower or that is rented. 
100% Risk Weight 
• Claims on the private sector 
• Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with residual maturity of over one 
year 
• Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated and funded in 
national currency) 
• Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector 
• Premises, plant and equipment, and other fixed assets 
• Real estate and other investments 
• Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from capital) 
• All other assets 
At National Discretion (0,10,20 or 50%) 
• Claims on domestic public-sector entities, excluding central governments, and loans 
guaranteed by securities issued by such entities 
 
 
Annex 6: Risk Weights  
CRITIQUE OF BASEL-I 
Basel-I accord was criticized  
• For taking a too simplistic approach to setting credit risk weights  
   and  
• For ignoring other types of risk 
 
• Risk weights were based on what the parties to the Accord negotiated rather than on 
the actual risk of each asset  
– Risk weights did not flow from any particular insolvency probability 
standard, and were for the most part, arbitrary. 
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– The requirements did not explicitly account for operating and other 
forms of risk that may also be important 
– Except for trading account activities, the capital standards did not 
account for hedging, diversification, and differences in risk 
management techniques 
 
1993 PROPOSAL: STANDARD MODEL 
• Total Risk= Credit Risk+ Market Risk 
• Market Risk= General Market Risk+ Specific Risk 
• General Market Risk= Interest Rate Risk+ Currency Risk+ Equity Price Risk + 
Commodity Price Risk  
• Specific Risk= Instruments Exposed to Interest Rate Risk and Equity Price Risk 
 
1996 MODIFICATION: INTERNAL MODEL 
 
• Internal Model → Value at Risk Methodology 
• Tier III Capital (Only for Market Risk) 
    i) Long Term subordinated debt 
    ii) Option not to pay if minimum required capital is <8% 
 
Advances in technology and finance allowed banks to develop their own capital 
allocation (internal) models in the 1990s. This resulted in more accurate calculations of 
bank capital than possible under Basel-I. These X models allowed banks to align the 
amount of risk they undertook on a loan with the overall goals of the bank 
 
 
Annex 7-Basel Accord I 
3.3 Basel 2 Committee 
Awareness of the weaknesses of the Basle I pact, but also the pressure of the market 
led to the start of work on its review by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the European Commission, which revise the capital adequacy guidelines, which, 
unlike the recommendations of the Basel Committee are mandatory. In 2001, the 
Basel Committee issued a new document, in which the revised proposals are 
presented in more detail, with a foreseen implementation time in 2004. The European 
Union, in turn, issued an annotated text which basically supported the Basel document 
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but it focused more on matters relating exclusively to Monetary Union and formed a 
basis for the alignment of the Basle within the Eurozone. 
Thus, on 26 June 2004, the revised supervisory framework was adopted 
Capital Adequacy, known as Basel II, and is due to be fully implemented by 2015. It 
focuses on three main areas, including minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
oversight and discipline market, which are known as three pillars. The aim is to 
strengthen and to supervise international banking requirements. The main objectives 
of the new Pact consist of the following:16 
• Emphasize the supervisory review process and its transparency 
market. 
• Adequate coverage of all financial and non-financial risks. 
• The gradual convergence of the level of regulatory own funds towards 
financial capital of banks through recognition by the supervisory 
authorities 
of the risk assessment carried out by the banks themselves. 
The new framework was designed to improve the way regulatory capital requirements 
reflect underlying risks and to better address the financial innovation that had 
occurred in recent years. The changes aimed at rewarding and encouraging continued 
improvements in risk measurement and control. The framework’s publication in June 
2004 followed almost six years of intensive preparation. During this period, the Basel 
Committee consulted extensively with banking sector representatives, supervisory 
agencies, central banks and outside observers in an attempt to develop significantly 
more risk-sensitive capital requirements. Following the June 2004 release, which 
focused primarily on the banking book, the Committee turned its attention to the 
trading book. In close cooperation with the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the international body of securities regulators, the Committee 
published in July 2005 a consensus document governing the treatment of banks’ 
trading books under the new framework. For ease of reference, this new text was 
integrated with the June 2004 text in a comprehensive document released in June 
2006: Basel II: International convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards: a revised framework - comprehensive version. Committee member 
countries and several non-member countries agreed to adopt the new rules, albeit on 
varying timescales. Thereafter, consistent implementation of the new framework 
across borders became a more challenging task for the Committee. One challenge that 
supervisors worldwide faced under Basel II was the need to approve the use of certain 
approaches to risk measurement in multiple jurisdictions. While this is not a new 
concept for the supervisory community – the Market Risk Amendment of 1996 
involved a similar requirement – Basel II extended the scope of such approvals and 
demanded an even greater degree of cooperation between home and host supervisors. 
To help address this issue, the Committee issued guidance on information-sharing in 
2006. In the following year, it followed up with advice on supervisory cooperation 
and allocation mechanisms in the context of the advanced measurement approaches 
for operational risk. 
                                                          
16 Zagorianos, N. & Marinos, G. (December 2006). "Securitization of Basel II Requirements". Available 
at: http://www.economia.gr 
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The new Basel Accord consists of three pillars:17 
I. The first pillar concerns the definition of capital requirements for coverage 
of credit and operational risk. 
II. The second pillar concerns the definition of the purpose to which it is intended 
process of assessing the capital adequacy of banks by supervisory authorities 
authorities, as well as the establishment of the general principles and criteria 
governing it 
this process. 
III. The third pillar concerns the strengthening of market discipline through the 
disclosure of specific qualitative and quantitative data. 
These three pillars of the new Pact are mutually reinforcing. 
Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the first pillar rules depends 
the ability of supervisors to control their proper implementation through the powers of 
the second pillar. Also, the increased reporting obligations of the 3rd pillar provide 
the appropriate incentives to improve the risk management processes developed by 
the banks. 
The bank's capital adequacy ratio represents the ratio between the bank's own funds 
and the assets (on and off-balance sheet) that have been hedged according to the risk 
determined to match them. 
According to the new Basel II accord, it is calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
3.3.1 Pillar 1 
 Minimum capital requirements Pillar 1 constitutes the most substantial part of Basel 
II. Its primary objectives are to increase the risk sensitivity of capital requirements 
and align them more closely to the core risks that banks face. These risks include: 
• credit risk, which refers to the risk of loss arising from a borrower 
defaulting on their obligations 
 • operational risk, which is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from external events 
 • traded market risk, which refers to the risk of loss from holding 
financial instruments for trading purposes and arises due to movements in 
market prices, such as interest rates, exchange rates, and equity values and  
• securitization risk, which refers to the risk of loss associated with buying 
or selling asset-backed securities. 
In addressing each of these core risks, Basel II recognizes that financial institutions 
differ significantly. As a result, Basel II moves away from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach in Basel I and provides banks with the opportunity to apply approaches that 
correspond to the different business and risk management practices that they employ. 
For each of the core risks that banks face, Basel II provides ‘standardized’ and 
‘internal model’ approaches to determine minimum capital requirements. None of the 
approaches are viewed as necessarily superior or inferior for all institutions. However, 
a major objective of Basel II is to promote improvements in banks’ risk management 
processes by encouraging banks to develop more sophisticated risk measurement 
                                                          
17 Zopounidis, K. & Liadaki, A. (January 2006). "Capital adequacy and the new banking supervision 
framework". Available at: http://www.morax.gr 
37 
 
systems and practices where it is cost effective for them to do so. Improvements in 
banks’ risk management processes will, in some cases, lead to lower minimum capital 
requirements. The following sections discuss the Basel II approaches to determining 
the capital required to meet the core risks faced by banks18. 
Credit risk  
Credit risk is the major risk that most banks must manage during the normal course of 
lending and credit underwriting. Within Basel II, there are two approaches to credit 
risk measurement: the standardized approach and the internal ratings based (IRB) 
approach. Standardized approach  
The standardized approach builds on the Basel I approach and is the default option for 
determining minimum capital requirements. The standardized approach retains the 
relative simplicity of Basel I while increasing the risk sensitivity of regulatory capital 
requirements.  
As with Basel I, the value of a bank’s on-and-off balance sheet assets are adjusted by 
risk weights that are applied according to the riskiness of the underlying assets. To 
increase the risk sensitivity of the capital requirement, credit ratings from eligible 
rating agencies (such as Fitch or Standard and Poor’s), are used to increase the 
number of risk weight categories applied to the underlying assets, relative to Basel I. 
In this way the standardized approach differentiates riskiness within asset classes as 
well as across different asset classes. 
Annex 8:  
Basel I and Basel II standardized approach to measuring the credit risk of a corporate loan 
  Basel II Basel i 
Credit Rating 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB to 
BB- 
Below 
BB- 
Unrated 
All 
Loans 
Asset Value $100M $100m $100m $100m $100m $100m 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 100% 
Risk Weight Asset $20m $50m $100m $100m $100m $100m 
Capital Requirment $1.6m $4m $8m $12 $8m $8m 
Erratum: Original cited $6.25m in column 2 last line. Corrected in the online edition 21 February 2012 to figure 
shown 
Annex 8 compares the capital required under Basel II for a corporate loan with 
varying credit ratings with the capital required for the same loan under Basel I. As can 
be seen the standardized approach implies a range of capital requirements depending 
on the riskiness of the loan, as proxied by the credit rating. Higher rated loans have 
lower capital requirements under Basel II than lower rated loans. The Basel I 
approach treats all corporate loans the same regardless of rating. 
The Basel II standardized approach also allows for additional methods of mitigating 
credit risks. It provides for improved methods of measuring the risks that are 
mitigated by collateral and allows netting of assets and liabilities in some cases. It 
also allows credit risks to be mitigated by instruments such as credit derivatives, the 
markets for which have evolved dramatically over the past 10 to 20 years, and are 
now commonly used by banks to reduce credit risk. 
 
 Internal-ratings based (IRB) approaches 
                                                          
18 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 68, No. 3 
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 The Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches represent the major development from 
Basel I in calculating minimum capital requirements. Over the past decade banks have 
invested heavily in economic capital models and systems that can better help them 
identify, measure, and manage the key risks that they face. The capability of 
modelling techniques has improved to the point that banks use them increasingly to 
determine internal capital targets, feed in to pricing strategies, assess risks, determine 
economic value added, and contribute to executive remuneration. The Basel 
Committee has recognized this development and looked to promote the development 
and use of these methods, where appropriate, by offering the IRB approaches to 
determine minimum capital requirements. Banks that apply the IRB approaches will 
base their minimum capital requirements on their own economic-capital models and 
systems.  
Modelling the risk of loss Annex 9, overleaf, provides a stylized version of how banks 
model the probability of loss in their portfolio of exposures. The area under the 
distribution represents the probability 
 
Annex 9-Risk of Losses 
of loss for a given period and loss size. The distribution is negatively skewed as most 
credit losses tend to be small, with few very large losses. Two main types of loss are 
illustrated. Expected loss refers to the normal losses from doing business and is either 
taken into account in banks’ pricing or met through specific provisions held on banks’ 
balance sheets. Unexpected loss refers to the losses not covered by pricing or 
provisioning. These losses must be absorbed by capital to avoid insolvency and are 
therefore the losses considered by capital requirements. It would be unreasonable and 
overly expensive for banks to hold enough capital to meet all unexpected loss events. 
Rather, banks hold enough capital to meet unexpected losses up to a given level. 
Unexpected losses over and above this level are referred to as stress losses and lead to 
bank insolvency. For Basel II regulatory purposes, banks are required to hold enough 
capital to meet unexpected losses with a probability of 0.999 over one year. Beyond 
this minimum required level, the amount of capital a bank will actually hold will 
depend on its internal risk appetite and market expectations. Risk parameters help 
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determine the shape and skewness of the density function depicted in Annex 9. There 
are four key risk parameters in Basel II:  
• Probability of default (PD) refers to the likelihood of a borrower defaulting on a 
contractual obligation.  
• Loss given default (LGD) is the proportion of the obligation that the bank expects to 
lose, in the event of a default. 
• Exposure at default (EAD) refers to the maximum amount of loss in the event of a 
default.  
• Maturity (M) refers to the remaining age of the obligation. 
 As each parameter increases, the capital required to meet that loss increases. To 
determine minimum capital requirements to meet credit risk, banks must categories 
the asset side of their balance sheet into five major groups – sovereign, corporate, 
bank, retail, and equity. Banks apply an internal rating to every exposure within each 
of these groups, using an array of information such as historical information and 
borrower characteristics. Ratings are then grouped into ‘buckets’ and banks use 
historical default information to assign exposures within each rating bucket with 
forward-looking cyclically adjusted estimates of the key risk parameters. Basel II 
recognizes that there are some difficulties in forecasting future events and the 
influence they will have on a particular borrower’s financial condition. As a result, 
banks must take conservative views of projected information and adopt a conservative 
bias where data limitations exist. A bank applying the IRB approach feeds their 
forward-looking estimates of these risk parameters into the IRB equation (which 
include the 99.9% probability referred to above) to determine its pillar 1 minimum 
capital requirements.19The IRB equation is based on the conditional probability of 
default of a single borrower with normally distributed asset returns. Based on Annex 
9, this is obviously not the ideal theoretical construct. However, it does reflect the 
realities of estimating capital requirements for regulatory purposes across many 
different banks20. Any risks associated with the assumptions underlying the IRB 
equation are considered as part of the supervisory review process outlined in pillar 
2.21 
Validation and accreditation requirements The Basel II framework recognizes that 
banks using advanced credit risk measurement techniques apply a variety of 
internally-developed or ‘off-the-shelf’ models and processes to determine their key 
risk parameters. Consequently, given the potential for differences across banks and 
the importance of estimating adequate minimum capital requirements, banks wishing 
to implement the IRB approach must first apply to regulators for accreditation to do 
so. To be accredited to use the IRB approaches, banks’ internal risk measurement 
methodologies must meet a number of strict quantitative and qualitative requirements. 
These include: 
                                                          
19 Basel II offers two IRB approaches. The foundation IRB approach requires banks to provide PD estimates only (the other risk 
parameters are provided by the framework), while the advanced IRB approach requires bank estimates of all the risk parameters.  
 
20 See Thomas and Wang (2005) for a discussion on the theoretical and institutional background to 
the IRB equation. 
21 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 68, No. 3 
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 • an appropriately risk-sensitive internal rating system, which comprises the methods, 
processes, controls, data collection, and IT systems that support the assessment of 
credit risk and the quantification of default and loss estimates;  
• facilities that capture borrower characteristics and sufficient default information to 
determine the estimates of the key risk parameters to within statistical confidence 
levels; 
 • appropriate corporate governance and internal controls 
• a modelling and capital estimation process that is embedded into the day -to-day 
operations of the bank and 
 • a validation and testing procedure that ensures the bank is confident that their 
approach produces the appropriate PD, LGD, EAD and capital estimates to address 
their credit risks. 
Operational risk  
Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate internal processes, 
people, and systems, or from external events. A good example of an operational loss 
event could be the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 as a result of internal control 
failures and massive speculative trading losses. Operational risk itself is not a new 
concept, and well-run organizations have been addressing it in their internal controls 
and corporate governance structures. However, applying an explicit regulatory capital 
charge against operational risk is a relatively new and evolving idea. Basel II requires 
banks to hold capital against the risk of unexpected loss that could arise from the 
failure of operational systems. As for credit risk, the framework provides simple and 
complex approaches to determine operational risk capital requirements. 
The standardized approaches 
 There are a number of standardized approaches that calculate operational risk capital 
as a proportion of bank income (the basic indicator approach and the standardized 
approach), bank assets, or a combination of both (the alternative standardized 
approach). The rationale behind the simple approaches is that as a bank increases in 
size (represented by balance sheet or income growth), operational risk increases and 
therefore operational risk capital should increase proportionately. The main advantage 
in applying these approaches to determine operational risk capital is their simplicity, 
and they are therefore targeted at banks applying the standardized approach to credit 
risk.  
The advanced measurement approach  
Similarly, to the IRB approaches to credit risk, the advanced measurement approach 
(AMA) measures capital charges for operational risk based upon risk parameters from 
a bank’s internal operational risk measurement system. Under this approach, 
minimum capital requirements depend on a bank’s internal loss estimates. As with the 
internal model approaches to credit risk, banks must fulfil qualitative and quantitative 
requirements before they are eligible to use the AMA. The Basel Committee and most 
regulators view that the estimation of operational risk capital using the AMA is still 
undergoing significant development. Indeed, a few regulators have not made the 
AMA available to banks operating within their jurisdiction, preferring to wait until 
there is evidence that statistical techniques will produce the appropriate loss estimates. 
In jurisdictions where the AMA is being made available to banks, it is typically being 
restricted to those banks applying the IRB approaches to credit risk.  
41 
 
Traded market risk  
Traded market risk refers to the risk of loss from holding financial instruments for 
trading purposes, and arises due to movements in market prices, such as interest rates, 
exchange rates, and equity values. In 1996 the Basel Committee released the Market 
Risk Amendment, which expanded Basel I to set minimum capital requirements for 
the various market risks that banks face. The Market Risk Amendment was in 
response to the increased trading activity by banks and the additional risk that this 
introduced.22. 
Basel II does not depart substantially from the Market Risk Amendment. Banks can 
use a standardized approach, which applies risk weights to open positions, or their 
own internal models23 to determine the minimum capital requirement. The main focus 
of Basel II is on ensuring that open positions in banks’ trading books can be valued 
appropriately. In particular, financial products should be marked to market or, where 
necessary, to demonstrably prudent models.  
Securitization risk  
Securitization is a process whereby a pool of similar loans (e.g., residential 
mortgages) or other financial assets is packaged and sold in the form of marketable 
securities. Securitization risk may arise from any of the following sources:  
• the risk from holding a security where the return is related to credit risk of the 
underlying assets that back the security 
• any residual credit risk that is not transferred off the originating bank’s balance 
sheet, or that could be reinstated as a result of insufficient legal protection from the 
default of the underlying assets.  
Treatment of securitization exposures  
As with the other pillar 1 risks, Basel II provides two broad approaches to measuring 
securitization exposures: the standardized and ratings based approaches. 
 Banks that apply the standardized approach to measuring credit risk must also apply 
the standardized approach to measuring securitization risk. The approach is similar to 
the standardized approach, whereby the minimum capital requirement is determined 
by risk weights that are applied to the held securities depending on the credit rating of 
the securitization issue. 
Under the internal-ratings based approach, banks use a similar but slightly more 
complex approach than the standardized approach for securities that have external or 
inferred ratings. Where these ratings are not available, banks can use their own 
internal assessments of the credit quality of the underlying exposures. Only banks that 
have received supervisory approval to use the IRB approach to credit risk can apply 
the internal models based approach to determine the credit risk associated with the 
exposure to a security.  
Recognizing risk transference  
Basel II specifies a number of conditions that a bank must meet before it can transfer 
credit risk from its balance sheet as a result of selling securities. These include 
                                                          
22 The Reserve Bank does not currently require capital to be held against traded market risk. Rather, banks must disclose 
information about their market risk exposures in their quarterly disclosure statements. 
 
23 Under the internal models approach, ‘value-at-risk’ must be computed on a daily basis using a 99th percentile, one tailed 
confidence interval. In calculating value-at-risk, an instantaneous price shock equivalent to a 10 day movement in prices is used. 
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evidence of the transference of significant credit risk to third parties, and that the bank 
does not maintain effective or indirect control over the transferred exposures 
 
3.3.2 Pillar 2: Supervisory review process  
Whereas pillar 1 of Basel II addresses the core risks (credit, operational, traded 
market, and securitization) that a bank faces, the main intention of the supervisory 
review process is to ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all of the 
material risks in their business.  
Pillar 2 recognizes that bank management is ultimately responsible for the business 
decisions that they make, and for ensuring that the bank is adequately capitalized to 
support its risks beyond the core minimum requirements covered in pillar 1. 
Consequently, the first stage of pillar 2 is for banks to develop a process that sets 
internal capital targets that are commensurate with their entire risk profile (including 
those identified as pillar 1 risks) and their control environment. 
 Pillar 2 also recognizes that supervisors monitor individual bank capital adequacy 
because of the wider implications of a bank failure. As a result, supervisors may want 
to evaluate how banks assess their capital needs relative to their risks, and to intervene 
where appropriate. This interaction is intended to foster an active dialogue between 
banks and supervisors such that when deficiencies are identified, banks take prompt 
and decisive action to reduce risk or restore capital.  
Basel II sets out four guiding principles that provide the framework for the 
supervisory review process:  
i. Banks must have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in 
relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels.  
ii. ii. Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal risk assessments and 
strategies and should take appropriate action if the results of this process are not 
satisfactory. 
iii.  iii. Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios 
iv.  iv. Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital 
from falling below the minimum levels required to support the bank’s risk 
characteristics.  
Implicit in the first principle is that all material risks faced by a bank should be 
addressed by the bank. The supervisor acts when capital is clearly below the 
minimum levels required to support all of the material risk characteristics of the 
bank. Three material risk characteristics that supervisors will pay particular 
attention, and that will be particularly suited to treatment under pillar 2 are 
considered below.  
 
Risks considered under pillar 1 that are not fully captured by the pillar 1 process 
There are likely to be residual pillar 1 risks resulting from the measurement methods 
used by banks. A good example is credit-concentration risk, which refers to the risk of 
loss due to the exposures in a portfolio being closely related or positively correlated. 
There are two main risks associated with credit concentration. The first is that 
borrowers in a concentrated portfolio tend to survive and fall together resulting in PDs 
and LGDs that cannot be considered independently. The second risk is that a portfolio 
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with similar types of assets may not possess the characteristics for modelling 
techniques to work adequately. 
Supervisors will also be interested in the approach taken by banks to meet model risks 
– those risks due to the underlying assumptions made by banks’ own models as well 
as the underlying assumptions made in the construct of the IRB equation. Supervisors 
would expect banks to take a conservative approach to capital calculations where 
there were concerns about the robustness of model assumptions.  
Bank risks that are not taken into account by the pillar 1 process  
Whereas interest rate risk in the trading book is considered under pillar 1, in many 
cases interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) is just as important. IRRBB is 
included within the supervisory review process as the Basel Committee believes that 
the variation of methods used by banks to model IRRBB makes it too difficult to 
include alongside other pillar 1 risks. However, Basel II does provide guidance to 
banks and supervisors that relate to the ability of bank models to include all material 
interest rate positions and to consider all relevant repricing and maturity data.  
Risk factors that are external to the bank  
The business cycle can have a number of effects on banks’ capital requirements. 
Firstly, Basel II requires banks’ estimates of the key risk factors to reflect the ability 
of borrowers to perform over an entire business cycle and not just the current or most 
recent economic period. Where risk factors are derived from historical information 
that does not contain at least one full cycle, minimum capital requirements will need 
to be adjusted accordingly. Similarly, banks should take into account the likelihood 
that recovery values for liquidated assets during an economic downturn are likely to 
be lower than normal and lead to higher or ‘stressed’ LGDs. Including a stressed LGD 
analysis through pillar 2 could potentially increase banks’ capital requirements. The 
nature of the tail of the loss distribution shown in figure 1 could be considered under 
pillar 2. Supervisors are particularly interested in the types of events that could lead to 
unexpected losses over and above those covered by capital and that result in bank 
failure. A useful method of doing this is to stress-test banks’ capital levels and the 
0.999 confidence interval included in the IRB equation. The main goal of stress-
testing is to investigate the ability of banks to absorb potential losses that may arise 
from a set of extreme but plausible shocks. Supervisors might require additional 
capital to be held if banks were not resilient to realistic macroeconomic stress events.  
While the pillar 1 framework for determining capital requirements is relatively 
advanced, regulators are still working hard to develop the supervisory review process 
and in particular how pillar 2 capital requirements will be determined. Ongoing work 
in the areas identified above will shed lighter as to how pillar 2 risks will be 
determined. 
 
3.3.3 Pillar 3: Market discipline  
Market participants have an interest in ensuring banks are adequately capitalized and 
through their actions can encourage the bank to behave prudently. This is often 
referred to as market discipline. In developing the Basel II framework, the Basel 
Committee decided to incorporate a greater role for market discipline by introducing 
capital adequacy-related public disclosure requirements for banks.  
44 
 
The objectives of market disciplines are reasonably straightforward. In a well-
functioning market, financial institutions with poorly developed risk management 
structures tend to be penalized by the market through higher funding costs because the 
banks’ counterparties assess the institution as more risky, while those with prudent 
risk management structures tend to be rewarded.  
A key component in promoting market discipline in this context is ensuring that bank 
customers, institutions, and other market participants have ready access to the 
appropriate information that allows them to monitor bank performance and risk-
taking. Pillar 3 achieves this by requiring banks to disclose, on a timely basis, relevant 
quantitative and qualitative information relating to the nature of their risks, their risk 
measurement processes, and their capital adequacy.24 
 
3.4 The Transition from Basel II to Basel III 
 
Implementation of the Basel II Accord coincided with financial crisis of 2007 - 2008, 
so it has not preceded it sufficient control over the Pact's ability to mitigate the effects 
of one economic crisis. Undoubtedly, Basle II has overestimated their potential banks 
to assess the risks they undertake. At the same time, it was done understands that 
certain categories of funds included in the supervisory framework are unable to cover 
potential losses, leading the Commission to revise the definitions of regulatory 
capital. For this reason, the Basel Committee announced on 12 September 2010 a 
new, undergoing framework, known as Basel III. 
Thus, on 16/12/2010 the Basel Committee published two major one’s reports, which 
formed the backbone of the Basel III Accord: 
• Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems  
•  Basel III: International Framework for liquidity risk measurement, 
standards and monitoring. 
These reports, along with all the amendments that followed and will 
follow, are the Basel Committee 's response to 
recent financial crisis in an effort to strengthen the stability of the financial 
system through: 
• Binary Regulatory Interventions for Shielding Banks in 
times of crisis 
• Macro-regulatory regulatory interventions to protect the bank 
the systemic risk arising for the whole 
sector, both from its cross-sectoral and from the time perspective 
At this point it should be noted that the gravity in Basel II was given to 
assessing as far as possible the assets subject to risk, 
in the denominator of the fraction of the capital adequacy ratio, while with 
Basel III gives weight to the available funds, its numerator 
fraction of the capital adequacy ratio. 
 
The graph below shows the differences between Basel II and Basel III: 
                                                          
24 International Journal of New Technology and Research (IJNTR) ISSN:2454-4116, Volume-3, Issue-1, January 2017 Pages 
66-70} {Basel II: A new capital framework Andrew Yeh, James Twaddle and Mike Frith, Financial Stability Department 
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Source:www.abhjeekdeshmukh.com 
Annex 10: Differences between Basel II and Basel III 
 
3.5 Basel III Accord 
Basel III is the third and the latest advancement of the Basel Accords and is a global 
regulatory standard set by the BCBS on capital adequacy (including a new leverage 
ratio and capital buffers), market liquidity risk (with new short-term and long-term 
liquidity ratios) and stress testing focusing on stability. The Basel III reforms to global 
regulatory standards were agreed by the G-20 in November 2010 and were then 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 2010 (BCBS, 
2010). The key aim of these reforms is to strengthen the capital adequacy 
requirements with regard to quality and quantity of capital which banks must hold in 
order to absorb losses The Basel III framework, whose main thrust has been 
enhancing the banking sector’s safety and stability, emphasizes the need to improve 
the quality and quantity of capital components, leverage ratio, liquidity standards, and 
enhanced disclosures. Basel III is therefore an effort to control the causes of the most 
recent crisis. Regulation of this sort has been effective in the past (BCBS, 2010). 
Basel III introduces new and enhanced rules, these includes the introduction of a new 
and stricter definition of capital – designed to increase consistency, transparency and 
quality of the capital base – and the introduction of a global liquidity standard (BCBS, 
2010). The two new liquidity ratios – the longer-term Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) and the short-term Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)–call on banks to raise 
high-quality liquid assets and acquire more stable sources of funding, ensuring that 
they are in agreement with the principles of liquidity risk management. In addition, 
Basel III introduces a new leverage ratio, a substitute to the risk-based Basel II 
framework. By setting 3 percent as the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total exposure, the 
new leverage ratio may limit banks’ scope of action (BCBS, 2010). Moreover, Basel 
III increases capital requirements for securities financing activities, repurchase 
agreements and counterparty credit risk arising from derivatives. Additionally, the 
new framework has formulated ways of reducing systemic risk and the cyclical effects 
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of Basel II. For instance, it introduces a countercyclical capital buffer and capital 
conservation, and discusses “through the- cycle” provisioning. Basel III is poised to 
have a significant impact on the world’s financial systems and economies. The 
implications for the banking industry from Basel III could be profound. According to 
BCBS (BCBS, 2010) new minimum capital standards changes combined with the 
higher capital charges for trading books make some business models less profitable or 
even unprofitable going forward and banks will need to rethink their strategy and 
business portfolio in the light of the changes. The potential impact of Basel III on the 
banking system is significant. Banks will experience increased pressure on their 
Return on Equity (RoE) due to increased liquidity and capital costs. In particular, 
Basel III creates incentives for banks to improve their operating processes – not only 
to meet requirements but also to increase efficiency and lower costs (BCBS, 2010). 
Banks are forced to improve their capital buffers through increased capital adequacy 
requirements, as well as the introduction of liquidity requirements and countercyclical 
macro prudential measures25 (BCBS, 2010). 
Regulatory bodies respond to this situation by introducing in Basel III capital accord 
such as they introduced leverage and buffer capital to facilitate efficient functioning 
of financial institutions and reduced any potential chances of credit crisis in the future. 
Basel III accord try to solve the puzzle about appropriate level of liquidity and capital. 
These complex regulations  help financial institutions to maintain their financial 
position thus reducing the chance of bank run. In short, these regulations result in 
effective management of liquidity and capital (Diamond and Rajan 2009; King & 
Tarbert 2011) 
 
Key Principles of Basel III 
  
1. Minimum Capital Requirements 
The Basel III accord raised the minimum capital requirements for banks from 2% in 
Basel II to 4,5% of common equity, as a percentage of the risk-weighted assets. There 
is also an additional 2,5% buffer capital requirement that brings the total equity to 7%. 
Banks can use the buffer when faced with financial stress, but doing so can lead to 
even more financial constrains when paying dividends. As from 2015, the Tier 1 
capital requirements increased from 4% in Basel II to 6% in Basel III. The 6% 
includes 4,5% of Common Equity Tier 1 and an extra 1,5% of additional Tier 1.The 
requirements were to be implemented starting 2012, but the implementation date has 
been postponed several times, and banks now have until March 31, 2019, to 
implement the changes. 
2. Leverage Ratio 
Basel III introduced a non-risk based leverage ratio to serve as a backstop to the risk-
based capital requirements. Banks are required to hold a leverage ratio in excess of 
3%. The non-risk based leverage ratio is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by the 
average total consolidated assets of a bank. To conform to the requirement, the 
Federal Reserve of the United States fixed the leverage ratio at 5% for insured bank 
holding companies, and 6% for Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). 
                                                          
25 International Journal of New Technology and Research (IJNTR) ISSN:2454-4116, Volume-3, Issue-1, January 2017 Pages 66-
70 
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𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
> 3% 
The main advantages of this indicator are: 
• Simplicity 
• Small tracking costs 
• Minimize monitoring risk 
• Discourages supervisory arbitrage 
• It is an anti-cyclical policy measure. 
However, this indicator also has some drawbacks, which are concentrated in the 
following: 
• Absence of empirical studies 
• Incorrect incentives 
• Difficulty in harmonizing calculation at international level. 
3. Liquidity Requirements 
Basel III introduced two liquidity ratios, i.e., Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable 
Funding Ratio. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio requires banks to hold sufficient high-
liquid assets that can withstand 30-day stressed funding scenario as specified by the 
supervisors. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio was introduced in 2015 with 60% 
requirements and is expected to increase by 10% each year till 2019 when it takes full 
effects. On the other hand, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requires banks to 
maintain stable funding above the required amount of stable funding for a period of 
one year of extended stress. NSFR was designed to address liquidity mismatch and 
will start being operational in 2018. 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑅:
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
> 100% 
 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅:
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
> 100% 
 
Finally, Basel III provides for ways to monitor their liquidity banks through 
supervisory tools, using five monitoring tools:26  
1.contractual maturity mismatch 
2. Concentration of funding 
3. Available unencumbered assets 
4. LCR by significant currency 
5. Market – related Monitoring Tools 
Impact of Basel III 
The requirement that banks must hold a minimum capital of 7% will make banks less 
profitable. Most banks will try to maintain a higher capital to cushion themselves 
from financial distress, even as they lower a number of loans issued to borrowers. 
They will be required to hold more capital against assets, which will reduce the size of 
their balance sheets. A study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2011 revealed that the medium-term effect of Basel III on 
GDP would be -0.05% to -0.15% annually. To stay afloat, banks will be forced to 
increase their lending spreads as they pass the extra cost to their customers. 
                                                          
26 Gortzos,Ch “Basel III:” Revision of the Commission 's current regulatory framework Basel for Banking Supervision in order 
to strengthen the stability of the international banking system”March,2011 
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The introduction of new liquidity requirements, mainly Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), will affect the operations of the bond 
market. To satisfy LCR liquid-asset criteria, banks will shy away from holding high 
run-off assets such as Special Purpose Vehicles and Structured Investment Vehicles. 
The demand for secularized assets and lower-quality corporate bonds will decrease 
due to the LCR bias towards banks holding government bonds and covered bonds. As 
a result, banks will hold more liquid assets and increase the proportion of long-term 
debts to reduce maturity mismatch and maintain minimum NSFR. Banks will also 
minimize business operations that are subject to liquidity risks. 
The implementation of Basel III will affect the derivatives markets, as more clearing 
brokers exit the market due to higher costs. Basel III capital requirements focus on 
reducing counterparty risk, which depends on whether the bank trades through a 
dealer or a central clearing counterparty (CCP). If a bank enters into a derivative trade 
with a dealer, Basel III creates a liability and requires a high capital charge for that 
trade. On the contrary, derivative trade through the CCP attracts only a 2% charge, 
which is attractive to banks. The exit of dealers would consolidate risks among fewer 
members, thereby making it difficult to transfer trades from one bank to another and 
increase systemic risk. 
 Criticisms against Basel III 
The Institute of International Finance, a 450-member banking trade association, 
located in the United States, protested the implementation of Basel III due to its 
potential to hurt banks and slow down economic growth. The study by OECD 
revealed that Basel III would decrease annual GDP growth rate by 0.05 to 0.15%. 
Further, the American Bankers Association and a host of Democrats in the U.S. 
Congress argued against the implementation of Basel III, saying that it would cripple 
small U.S. banks by increasing their capital holdings on mortgage and SME loans. 
How do the Basel III proposals bear on these issues, in the sense of helping to ensure 
that the chance of another crisis like the current one can be greatly reduced? The 
Basel III capital proposals have some very useful elements – notably the support for a 
leverage ratio, a capital buffer and the proposal to deal with procyclicality through 
dynamic provisioning based on expected losses. Adopting the buffer capital proposal 
to ensure the leverage ratio was not compromised in crisis situations seems especially 
important – so that in good times, dividends, share buyback policies and bonuses 
would be restrained as necessary to build back buffers used up in bad times – seems 
very important. ( Atkinson P. 2010) 
Annex 11-The Basel 3 effect 
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Shortcomings of Basel II   → 
Components of Basel 
III 
Unclear and inconsistent capital 
definition   → 
Enhanced 
transparency, 
consistency and quality 
of capital base 
Exposure to some risk not 
addressed (e.g. re-securitization 
etc.)   → 
Risk coverage includes 
securitisations, off BS 
items and CCR 
Inadequate treatment of 
Liquidity Risk   → 
Enhanced liquidity 
standards including LCR 
& NSFR 
Excessive BS growth despite 
relatively small levels of capital   → 
Leverage ratio 
introduced as a risk-
invariant measure of 
BS growth 
Causes pro-cyclical amplification 
of shocks in financial sector   → 
Adoption of measures 
to counteract pro-
cyclicality 
Source: (Edu-Pristine, 2011)  
Annex 12- Improvements of Basel III over Basel II 
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                                      CHAPTER 4 
 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF MAJORS HELLENIC BANKS 
 
4.1  Financial Analysis of Greek Banks 
 
In order to detect the factors that affect the capital adequacy of banking institutions, it 
is appropriate to present the main financial data of Greek banks in the years 2006 to 
2017. 
The 12 financial institutions that formed the Branch of Banks and were active in the 
Athens Stock Exchange, accumulating more than 90% of the share of the Greek 
market, were the following: 
• ΑΤΕ Bank  
• Alpha Bank  
• Attica Bank 
• Cyprus Bank 
• Eurobank Ergasias Bank 
• Geniki Bank 
• Marfin Bank 
• National Bank Of Greece 
• New Proton Bank 
• Piraeus Bank 
• Post Bank of Greece 
• T Bank 
At this point, it should be noted that following the recent developments in banking 
sector and the need for recapitalization have been under pressure merging, which led 
to:  
– The takeover of ATE Bank, Cyprus Bank and Geniki Bank from Piraeus Bank. 
– Merge of T Bank, Post Bank as well as New Proton Bank with Eurobank Ergasias 
Bank. 
– Takeover of Emporiki Bank from Alpha Bank. 
For the preparation of this coursework, they will be used the financial data of the 
groups of banks that continue their operation until today. 
Below is a financial analysis of each bank separately for the period from 2006 to 
2017, based on the published financials the data27  
For the year 2017 we use the Financial Reports that refers to the period till 
30/09/2017 due to the fact that the final Financial Report haven’t been published yet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Financial Statements of Banks 
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4.1.1 Alpha bank 
Annex 13: Assets and Liabilities-Alpha Bank 
 
 
Annex 14: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks 1.477.675 1.650.327 1.724.081 2.725.974 2.805.166 1.280.230 770.193 1.006.294 1.265.442 698.730 674.439 1.177.430
Due from banks 6.184.088 7.349.675 8.420.793 12.161.433 8.824.257 6.853.617 6.623.503 5.036.860 4.714.551 3.406.859 2.912.313 1.774.658
Securities held for trading 346.207 264.788 86.880 66.946 35.796 14.492 14.119 7.001 1.729 1.888 2.865 18.049
Derivative financial assets 254.566 384.466 494.386 373.600 442.013 649.102 740.614 807.911 1.153.944 794.471 644.436 568.690
Loans and advances to customers 28.237.691 35.267.874 42.189.278 41.810.755 39.919.035 38.316.053 32.796.574 44.236.465 43.475.910 41.558.014 40.261.524 43.566.603
Investment securities 7.504.394 6.342.747 42.195 48.325 47.706 40.496 31.683 28.205 31.939 28.813 27.836 626.625
Total Assets 46.768.612 54.039.136 66.738.174 67.848.576 63.770.895 58.630.819 53.773.359 68.103.047 67.634.557 64.992.882 60.402.573 61.290.405
Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks 7.222.117 5.637.562 10.883.969 15.291.428 18.729.995 21.262.215 25.825.551 19.355.329 17.558.462 25.170.637 19.433.001 14.945.489
Due to customers 20.372.543 23.334.888 33.816.094 35.258.048 31.233.710 25.544.490 23.191.009 37.504.689 37.817.447 27.733.679 29.009.979 33.900.174
Derivative financial liabilities 226.223 383.129 804.172 628.886 1.106.591 1.469.142 1.529.730 1.374.261 1.946.401 1.556.555 1.337.559 1.028.591
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds 15.148.320 20.521.976 17.395.646 10.405.582 6.980.873 5.297.410 2.317.252 1.295.445 2.021.165 406.231 598.759 470.390
Other liabilities and Provisions 531.212 51.529 8.415 3.768 9.247 15.989 30.173 258.945 333.520 410.446 383.188 348.668
Total Liabilities 46.768.612 54.039.136 66.738.174 67.848.576 63.770.895 58.630.819 53.773.359 68.103.047 67.634.557 64.992.882 60.402.573 61.290.405
Assets Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Total Assets 3,16% 3,05% 2,58% 4,02% 4,40% 2,18% 1,43% 1,48% 1,87% 1,08% 1,12% 1,92%
Due from banks/Total Assets 13,22% 13,60% 12,62% 17,92% 13,84% 11,69% 12,32% 7,40% 6,97% 5,24% 4,82% 2,90%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 0,74% 0,49% 0,13% 0,10% 0,06% 0,02% 0,03% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03%
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 0,54% 0,71% 0,74% 0,55% 0,69% 1,11% 1,38% 1,19% 1,71% 1,22% 1,07% 0,93%
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 60,38% 65,26% 63,22% 61,62% 62,60% 65,35% 60,99% 64,96% 64,28% 63,94% 66,66% 71,08%
Investment securities/Total Assets 16,05% 11,74% 0,06% 0,07% 0,07% 0,07% 0,06% 0,04% 0,05% 0,04% 0,05% 1,02%
Liabilities Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 15,44% 10,43% 16,31% 22,54% 29,37% 36,26% 48,03% 28,42% 25,96% 38,73% 32,17% 24,38%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 43,56% 43,18% 50,67% 51,97% 48,98% 43,57% 43,13% 55,07% 55,91% 42,67% 48,03% 55,31%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 0,48% 0,71% 1,20% 0,93% 1,74% 2,51% 2,84% 2,02% 2,88% 2,39% 2,21% 1,68%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities 32,39% 37,98% 26,07% 15,34% 10,95% 9,04% 4,31% 1,90% 2,99% 0,63% 0,99% 0,77%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 1,14% 0,10% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,03% 0,06% 0,38% 0,49% 0,63% 0,63% 0,57%
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4.1.2 Attica Bank 
Annex 15: Assets and Liabilities Attica Bank 
 
Annex 16: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
 
4.1.3 Eurobank Ergasias Bank 
Annex 17: Assets and Liabilities Eurobank Ergasias Bank 
Annex 18: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks 100.022 164.582 120.443 146.288 86.367 109.968 109.461 70.944 106.948 49.558 43.361 38.028
Due from banks 402.558 559.130 627.116 617.736 304.911 29.395 52.319 82.544 43.202 9.557 4.870 1.751
Securities held for trading 20.499 22.021 0 - - - - - - - - -
Derivative financial assets 36 36 313 5.048 4.384 3.754 1.287 4.852 11.168 3.569 84 160
Loans and advances to customers 2.315.882 2.900.606 3.385.815 3.922.449 3.709.704 3.584.492 3.240.904 3.300.523 3.193.064 2.757.428 2.776.959 2.191.351
Investment securities 123.900 89.208 28.768 34.333 43.769 44.758 43.339 45.841 46.510 58.190 56.369 58.680
Total Assets 3.092.770 3.904.628 4.519.160 5.259.340 4.780.734 4.348.597 3.906.305 4.060.313 3.962.330 3.674.024 3.619.184 3.558.778
Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks 297.076 447.833 1.068.225 1.082.640 778.053 683.505 730.931 181.153 203.311 783.768 1.025.342 987.414
Due to customers 2.423.405 2.919.784 2.956.553 3.433.627 3.331.029 3.099.573 2.931.371 3.327.619 3.268.298 2.157.384 1.906.224 1.836.911
Derivative financial liabilities 0 74 30 7 844 77 - - - - 236 51
Debt securities in issue held by institutional 
investors and other borrowed funds 149.070 149.129 99.541 94.295 94.360 94.411 94.497 79.133 79.229 0 0 0
Other liabilities and Provisions 42.565 33.677 24.302 14.385 12.216 26.696 33.769 39.263 27.371 24.976 16.880 42.051
Total Liabilities 3.092.770 3.904.628 4.519.160 5.259.340 4.780.734 4.348.597 3.906.305 4.060.313 3.962.330 3.674.024 3.619.184 3.558.778
Assets Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Total Assets 3,23% 4,22% 2,67% 2,78% 1,81% 2,53% 2,80% 1,75% 2,70% 1,35% 1,20% 1,07%
Due from banks/Total Assets 13,02% 14,32% 13,88% 11,75% 6,38% 0,68% 1,34% 2,03% 1,09% 0,26% 0,13% 0,05%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 0,66% 0,56% 0,00% - - - - - - - - -
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,10% 0,09% 0,09% 0,03% 0,12% 0,28% 0,10% 0,00% 0,00%
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 74,88% 74,29% 74,92% 74,58% 77,60% 82,43% 82,97% 81,29% 80,59% 75,05% 76,73% 61,58%
Investment securities/Total Assets 4,01% 2,28% 0,64% 0,65% 0,92% 1,03% 1,11% 1,13% 1,17% 1,58% 1,56% 1,65%
Liabilities Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 9,61% 11,47% 23,64% 20,59% 16,27% 15,72% 18,71% 4,46% 5,13% 21,33% 28,33% 27,75%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 78,36% 74,78% 65,42% 65,29% 69,68% 71,28% 75,04% 81,95% 82,48% 58,72% 52,67% 51,62%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,02% 0,00% - - - - 0,01% 0,00%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional 
investors and other borrowed funds/Total 
Liabilities 4,82% 3,82% 2,20% 1,79% 1,97% 2,17% 2,42% 1,95% 2,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 1,38% 0,86% 0,54% 0,27% 0,26% 0,61% 0,86% 0,97% 0,69% 0,68% 0,47% 1,18%
ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks 1.641.000 1.259.000 2.535.000 1.731.000 2.230.000 1.563.000 2.065.000 1.986.000 1.948.000 1.798.000 1.477.000 1.254.000
Due from banks 5.196.000 16.545.000 31.695.000 39.828.000 29.483.000 25.353.000 4.693.000 2.567.000 3.059.000 2.808.000 2.759.000 2.275.000
Securities held for trading 0 - - - - - - - - - - -
Derivative financial assets 1.148.000 1.282.000 1.659.000 1.460.000 1.725.000 2.225.000 1.888.000 1.264.000 2.134.000 1.884.000 1.980.000 1.747.000
Loans and advances to customers 30.183.000 37.235.000 46.757.000 45.432.000 47.918.000 42.551.000 43.171.000 45.610.000 42.133.000 39.893.000 39.058.000 37.192.000
Investment securities 10.019.000 9.355.000 2.563.000 2.428.000 2.055.000 96.000 616.000 728.000 876.000 925.000 905.000 330.000
Total Assets 50.057.000 68.272.000 93.065.000 99.856.000 90.372.000 79.605.000 67.653.000 77.586.000 75.518.000 73.553.000 66.393.000 60.800.000
Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks 11.550.000 15.300.000 27.663.000 30.604.000 33.505.000 36.587.000 29.047.000 16.907.000 12.610.000 25.267.000 13.906.000 11.080.000
Due to customers 30.363.000 38.939.000 44.467.000 45.807.000 40.522.000 28.392.000 30.752.000 41.535.000 40.878.000 31.446.000 34.031.000 33.201.000
Derivative financial liabilities 734.000 935.000 2.792.000 2.151.000 2.689.000 2.974.000 2.677.000 1.558.000 2.475.000 2.359.000 2.441.000 1.974.000
Debt securities in issue held by institutional 
investors and other borrowed funds 3.515.000 7.919.000 13.859.000 15.299.000 8.032.000 6.427.000 -1.299.000 4.165.000 5.559.000 6.420.000 6.672.000 6.847.000
Other liabilities and Provisions - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total Liabilities 50.057.000 68.272.000 93.065.000 99.856.000 90.372.000 79.605.000 67.653.000 77.586.000 75.518.000 73.553.000 66.393.000 60.800.000
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4.1.4 National Bank of Greece 
Annex 19: Assets and Liabilities NBG 
 
Annex 20: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
 
 
Assets Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Total Assets 3,28% 1,84% 2,72% 1,73% 2,47% 1,96% 3,05% 2,56% 2,58% 2,44% 2,22% 2,06%
Due from banks/Total Assets 10,38% 24,23% 34,06% 39,89% 32,62% 31,85% 6,94% 3,31% 4,05% 3,82% 4,16% 3,74%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 0,00% - - - - - - - - - - -
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 2,29% 1,88% 1,78% 1,46% 1,91% 2,80% 2,79% 1,63% 2,83% 2,56% 2,98% 2,87%
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 60,30% 54,54% 50,24% 45,50% 53,02% 53,45% 63,81% 58,79% 55,79% 54,24% 58,83% 61,17%
Investment securities/Total Assets 20,02% 13,70% 2,75% 2,43% 2,27% 0,12% 0,91% 0,94% 1,16% 1,26% 1,36% 0,54%
Liabilities  Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 23,07% 22,41% 29,72% 30,65% 37,07% 45,96% 42,94% 21,79% 16,70% 34,35% 20,94% 18,22%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 60,66% 57,04% 47,78% 45,87% 44,84% 35,67% 45,46% 53,53% 54,13% 42,75% 51,26% 54,61%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 1,47% 1,37% 3,00% 2,15% 2,98% 3,74% 3,96% 2,01% 3,28% 3,21% 3,68% 3,25%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional 
investors and other borrowed funds/Total 
Liabilities 7,02% 11,60% 14,89% 15,32% 8,89% 8,07% -1,92% 5,37% 7,36% 8,73% 10,05% 11,26%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities - - - - - - - - - - - -
ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks 2.219.796 4.135.632 1.959.249 2.073.721 5.069.505 1.960.765 1.213.000 2.195.000 1.870.000 2.208.000 1.501.000 1.208.000
Due from banks 4.539.923 4.318.696 5.202.048 5.881.701 7.091.089 7.335.865 4.195.000 3.478.000 3.790.000 2.799.000 2.227.000 1.886.000
Securities held for trading 12.283.625 11.048.630 1.717.902 3.003.966 1.082.292 - 1.046.000 908.000 - - - -
Derivative financial assets 204.690 331.206 1.303.708 1.670.914 1.542.961 2.487.130 3.380.000 2.581.000 4.796.000 3.895.000 4.482.000 3.563.000
Loans and advances to customers 32.755.298 39.568.570 55.798.270 59.613.250 65.277.894 62.936.244 47.000.000 46.327.000 43.531.000 45.375.000 41.643.000 38.072.000
Investment securities 2.542.531 2.537.345 0 0 0 0 0 0 600 8.690 8.690 8.670
Total Assets 61.145.069 71.058.950 83.819.855 91.220.464 96.304.857 93.178.304 77.939.000 84.197.000 81.946.000 111.232.000 78.531.000 65.843.000
Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks 5.871.463 8.935.585 13.801.415 18.390.685 28.869.460 31.520.508 33.287.000 26.473.000 20.481.000 25.166.000 18.188.000 9.855.000
Due to customers 44.564.664 49.259.670 56.291.053 58.081.167 52.471.008 45.446.938 40.908.000 45.290.000 44.130.000 42.959.000 40.459.000 38.795.000
Derivative financial liabilities 344.687 580.062 1.426.951 1.204.621 1.404.051 3.119.235 4.373.000 2.559.000 5.706.000 4.638.000 5.169.000 3.798.000
Debt securities in issue held by institutional 
investors and other borrowed funds 0 3.482.135 3.482.135 2.694.486 3.181.869 977.770 - - 1.743.000 1.252.000 536.000 288.000
Other liabilities and Provisions - - - - - 2.130.024 2.168.000 2.093.000 963.000 1.251.000 1.118.000 963.000
Total Liabilities 61.145.069 71.058.950 83.819.855 91.220.464 96.304.857 93.178.304 77.939.000 84.197.000 81.946.000 111.232.000 78.531.000 65.843.000
Assets Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Total Assets 3,63% 5,82% 2,34% 2,27% 5,26% 2,10% 1,56% 2,61% 2,28% 1,99% 1,91% 1,83%
Due from banks/Total Assets 7,42% 6,08% 6,21% 6,45% 7,36% 7,87% 5,38% 4,13% 4,62% 2,52% 2,84% 2,86%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 20,09% 15,55% 2,05% 3,29% 1,12% - 1,34% 1,08% - - - -
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 0,33% 0,47% 1,56% 1,83% 1,60% 2,67% 4,34% 3,07% 5,85% 3,50% 5,71% 5,41%
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 53,57% 55,68% 66,57% 65,35% 67,78% 67,54% 60,30% 55,02% 53,12% 40,79% 53,03% 57,82%
Investment securities/Total Assets 4,16% 3,57% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Liabilities Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 9,60% 12,57% 16,47% 20,16% 29,98% 33,83% 42,71% 31,44% 24,99% 22,62% 23,16% 14,97%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 72,88% 69,32% 67,16% 63,67% 54,48% 48,77% 52,49% 53,79% 53,85% 38,62% 51,52% 58,92%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 0,56% 0,82% 1,70% 1,32% 1,46% 3,35% 5,61% 3,04% 6,96% 4,17% 6,58% 5,77%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional 
investors and other borrowed funds/Total 
Liabilities 0,00% 4,90% 4,15% 2,95% 3,30% 1,05% - - 2,13% 1,13% 0,68% 0,44%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities - - - - - 2,29% 2,78% 2,49% 1,18% 1,12% 1,42% 1,46%
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4.1.5 Piraeus Bank 
Annex 21: Assets and Liabilities Piraeus Bank 
 
Annex 22: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks 1.361.547 2.066.182 2.486.574 1.747.045 1.523.902 2.658.565 2.091.406 1.912.478 2.864.234 2.444.752 3.071.788 3.214.997
Due from banks 2.968.672 4.296.193 4.636.273 4.442.538 4.424.327 3.475.982 2.620.677 1.163.172 932.793 787.795 118.859 142.747
Securities held for trading 1.866.702 4.403.891 1.166.899 1.041.535 184.259 226.620 81.209 27.692 2.059.917 2.407.828 2.740.246 2.626.651
Derivative financial assets 109.428 584.462 356.820 170.606 142.258 2.299.675 423.395 321.307 506.941 437.028 449.482 458.071
Loans and advances to customers 18.728.736 26.762.959 33.482.618 31.245.446 31.189.760 30.678.773 37.618.002 57.399.117 53.987.068 49.425.753 49.707.608 45.662.646
Investment securities 1.111.713 1.274.431 42.676 121.221 188.010 200.357 435.871 291.057 321.636 317.980 1.208.647 1.141.230
Total Assets 27.941.609 42.343.311 50.212.997 48.922.004 51.786.358 51.200.704 63.022.379 85.777.870 84.603.099 83.002.278 81.504.371 68.173.999
Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks 4.709.542 10.704.842 14.445.532 14.250.445 20.348.801 24.856.163 32.515.139 27.251.988 24.566.067 34.591.752 27.020.940 14.373.965
Due to customers 14.606.019 19.030.022 24.109.587 25.729.695 24.051.885 20.277.836 31.107.800 48.498.391 50.240.344 36.771.355 42.364.829 41.821.740
Derivative financial liabilities 61.069 83.609 360.907 160.575 182.219 329.234 419.846 325.996 538.260 444.639 657.127 430.355
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds 6.222.249 8.693.073 7.742.696 4.905.404 3.181.065 2.289.277 -2.744.356 8.269.089 7.386.867 9.608.016 9.663.623 9.723.674
Other liabilities and Provisions - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total Liabilities 27.941.609 42.343.311 50.212.997 48.922.004 51.786.358 51.200.704 63.022.379 85.777.870 84.603.099 83.002.278 81.504.371 68.173.999
Assets Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Total Assets 4,87% 4,88% 4,95% 3,57% 2,94% 5,19% 3,32% 2,23% 3,39% 2,95% 3,77% 4,72%
Due from banks/Total Assets 10,62% 10,15% 9,23% 9,08% 8,54% 6,79% 4,16% 1,36% 1,10% 0,95% 0,15% 0,21%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 6,68% 10,40% 2,32% 2,13% 0,36% 0,44% 0,13% 0,03% 2,43% 2,90% 3,36% 3,85%
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 0,39% 1,38% 0,71% 0,35% 0,27% 4,49% 0,67% 0,37% 0,60% 0,53% 0,55% 0,67%
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 67,03% 63,20% 66,68% 63,87% 60,23% 59,92% 59,69% 66,92% 63,81% 59,55% 60,99% 66,98%
Investment securities/Total Assets 3,98% 3,01% 0,08% 0,25% 0,36% 0,39% 0,69% 0,34% 0,38% 0,38% 1,48% 1,67%
Liabilities Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 16,85% 25,28% 28,77% 29,13% 39,29% 48,55% 51,59% 31,77% 29,04% 41,68% 33,15% 21,08%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 52,27% 44,94% 48,01% 52,59% 46,44% 39,60% 49,36% 56,54% 59,38% 44,30% 51,98% 61,35%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 0,22% 0,20% 0,72% 0,33% 0,35% 0,64% 0,67% 0,38% 0,64% 0,54% 0,81% 0,63%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities 22,27% 20,53% 15,42% 10,03% 6,14% 4,47% -4,35% 9,64% 8,73% 11,58% 11,86% 14,26%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities - - - - - - - - - - - -
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4.2 Analysis of key financial ratios per bank 
The major Financial ratios per bank are presented below: 
4.2.1 Alpha Bank 
Οn the basis of the abovementioned data the following indicators arise: 
Annex 22: Financial Ratios Alpha Bank 
 
Alpha Bank has an equal cost in relation to its revenues over the years except from 
year 2012, which appears to have increased expenditure in relation to its revenue and 
years 2008 and 2009, which has managed to bear its costs. Generally, there is an 
image of balance. However, it appears to be a stagnation in the staff cost index, except 
for the year 2012, which generally the expenses appear to be over against revenue, but 
also seems to be a stability to the loan-to-deposit ratio. In addition, profits appear to 
be falling in 2010 and beyond and a fluctuation from 2013 until today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALPHA BANK 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 42.35% 49.07% 24.62% 20.57% 51.59% 47.32% 104.50% 65.99% 64.82% 54.09% 51.34% 45.52%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 22.73% 24.37% 77.48% 67.01% 24.28% 22.79% 49.98% 29.04% 27.54% 22.00% 21.28% 19.02%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 70.30% 77.35% 77.48% 67.01% 81.34% 78.90% 127.28% 80.58% 81.03% 88.10% 80.60% 78.47%
Profit after Taxes 502,293 457,006 334,238 428,657 -56,309 -384.266 -1,132,934 2,857,021 -58,529 -1,032,276 42,302 85,081
Basic earnings per share 1.28 1.13 0.7498 0.8188 -0.2139 -7.3331 -1.1732 0.4303 -0.2373 -2.6792 0.03 0.06
LIQUIDITY INDICATORS
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 3.16% 3.05% 2.58% 4.02% 4.40% 2.18% 1.43% 1.48% 1.87% 1.08% 1.12% 1.92%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 138.61% 151.14% 124.76% 118.58% 127.81% 150.00% 141.42% 117.95% 114.96% 149.85% 138.79% 128.51%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 7.25% 7.07% 5.10% 7.73% 8.98% 5.01% 3.32% 2.68% 3.35% 2.52% 2.32% 3.47%
CREDIT RISK INDICATOR
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 60.38% 65.26% 63.22% 61.62% 62.60% 65.35% 60.99% 64.96% 64.28% 63.94% 66.66% 71.08%
PROFITABILITY INDICATOR
ROE=Net Income/Equity 20.62% 16.68% 14.11% 8.98% -1.27% -0.06% 263.25% 39.97% -0.86% -12.26% 0.46% 0.90%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 1.07% 0.85% 0.50% 0.63% -0.09% 0.00% -2.11% 4.20% -0.09% -1.59% 0.07% 0.14%
ILLEGAL INDEX
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 19.20 19.72 28.17 14.21 14.39 98.88 -124.95 9.53 9.92 7.72 6.63 6.49
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4.2.2 Attica Bank 
Οn the basis of the abovementioned data the following indicators arise: 
Annex 23: Financial Ratios Attica Bank 
 
From the above, we see that the bank presents a balance in the staff cost ratio beyond 
2012 and 2013, which has a sudden rise but then again on balance in the coming 
years, but in the last year we see a significant decrease. It also shows an increase in 
the Loans to Deposits and Net Income ratios from interest to total revenue except the 
last year that there is a significant decrease. However, we see a reduction in the profit 
from 2010 and then, which cause damages, with a recovery in the last year. 
4.2.3 Eurobank Ergasias Bank 
Οn the basis of the abovementioned data the following indicators arise: 
Annex 24: Financial Ratios Eurobank Ergasias Bank 
 
We can see that the Eurobank Ergasias bank generally holds at a constant level, with 
small differentiations, the staff cost index towards total revenues while its cash and 
balances is fluctuating within the last decade. The profits of this bank also dropped 
ATTICA BANK 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 97.82% 81.25% 90.14% 88.74% 98.65% 329.79% 451.55% 334.73% 241.98% 63.41% 121.30% 90.59%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 45.81% 35.86% 39.92% 40.79% 43.06% 58.33% 104.37% 97.66% 41.05% 39.46% 40.92% 19.67%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 67.19% 64.56% 72.41% 70.03% 76.41% 87.02% 75.61% 69.51% 76.26% 79.35% 81.83% 42.62%
Profit after Taxes 51,283.67 200,285.00 102,346.00 93,501.00 -59,969.00 -253,442.00 -180,886.00 -1,131,600.00 -499,246.00 -3,494,848 -155,130 74,490
Basic earnings per share 0.001 0.186 0.0643 0.0254 -0.0556 -1.0679 -0.7716 -0.1523 -0.0427 -0.2906 -0.01 -0.0007
LIQUIDITY INDICATORS
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 3.23% 4.22% 2.67% 2.78% 1.81% 2.53% 2.80% 1.75% 2.70% 1.35% 1.20% 1.07%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 95.56% 99.34% 114.52% 114.24% 111.37% 115.64% 110.56% 99.19% 97.70% 127.81% 145.68% 119.30%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 4.13% 5.64% 4.07% 4.26% 2.59% 3.55% 3.73% 2.13% 3.27% 2.30% 2.27% 2.07%
CREDIT RISK INDICATOR
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 74.88% 74.29% 74.92% 74.58% 77.60% 82.43% 82.97% 81.29% 80.59% 75.05% 76.73% 61.58%
PROFITABILITY INDICATOR
ROE=Net Income/Equity 3.35% 6.33% 3.19% 1.60% -1.15% -9.98% -19.70% -27.99% -14.28% -51.99% -2.45% 1.17%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 1.66% 5.13% 2.26% 1.78% -1.25% -5.83% -4.63% -27.87% -12.60% -95.12% -4.29% 2.09%
ILLEGAL INDEX
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 2.02 1.23 1.41 0.90 0.92 1.71 4.25 1.00 1.13 0.55 0.57 0.56
Eurobank Ergasias Bank 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 42,09% 41,35% 47,79% 48,37% 48,77% 50,45% 59,94% 67,49% 57,63% 57,72% 48,11% 48,13%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 23,78% 22,22% 14,95% 16,67% 15,49% 17,65% 21,20% 37,11% 31,12% 30,02% 26,33% 27,45%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 77,98% 72,32% 72,78% 76,98% 77,09% 88,27% 83,25% 81,54% 81,85% 83,03% 75,07% 78,60%
Profit after Taxes 475.000 705.000 677.000 316.000 84.000 -549.600 -1.440.000 -1.157.000 -1.196.000 -1.155.000 249.000 72.000
Basic earnings per share 10 12 1,17 0,41 0,15 -10,4202 -2,1408 0,41 -9,0588 -3,6824 0,11 0,06
LIQUIDITY INDICATORS
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 3,28% 1,84% 2,72% 1,73% 2,47% 1,96% 3,05% 2,56% 2,58% 2,44% 2,22% 2,06%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 99,41% 95,62% 105,15% 99,18% 118,25% 149,87% 140,38% 109,81% 103,07% 126,86% 114,77% 112,02%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 5,40% 3,23% 5,70% 3,78% 5,50% 5,51% 6,72% 4,78% 4,77% 5,72% 4,34% 3,78%
CREDIT RISK INDICATOR
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 60,30% 54,54% 50,24% 45,50% 53,02% 53,45% 63,81% 58,79% 55,79% 54,24% 58,83% 61,17%
PROFITABILITY INDICATOR
ROE=Net Income/Equity 15,02% 14,49% 18,87% 7,35% 1,38% -62,81% -219,85% -25,58% -18,97% -16,19% 3,39% 1,04%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 0,95% 1,03% 0,73% 0,32% 0,09% -0,69% -2,13% -1,49% -1,58% -1,57% 0,38% 0,12%
ILLEGAL INDEX
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 15,83 14,03 25,95 23,23 14,83 90,98 103,29 17,15 11,98 10,31 9,03 8,82
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significantly, resulting in losses in 2011 that almost doubled in 2012, but it seems that 
in the last two years there has been a rise in the positive levels 
4.2.4 National Bank of Greece 
Οn the basis of the abovementioned data the following indicators arise: 
Annex 25: Financial ratios NBG 
 
And in the National Bank of Greece there is an increase in expenses and wages with 
scrapping in the year 2012, which we observe in general as a year-by-year change for 
each bank. There is also an increase in the indicator of fixed interest income in the 
total revenues. In this bank, we see fluctuations in earnings over the years even 
causing damages, notably in 2011 and 2012 
4.2.5 Piraeus Bank 
Οn the basis of the abovementioned data the following indicators arise: 
Annex 26: Financial Ratios Piraeus Bank 
 
The Piraeus Bank, following the trend of the whole sector, shows an increase in its 
expenses compared to its revenues, with the exception of the year 2012 that appears to 
have experienced a significant decrease. We see a relative calm in the wage bill with a 
decline in the years 2012 and 2013 but immediately afterwards restores to original 
National Bank of Greece 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 45,81% 46,33% 52,00% 50,60% 61,57% 59,91% 132,38% 66,99% 69,69% 60,77% 53,29% 60,73%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 34,49% 34,56% 37,61% 37,75% 44,11% 44,93% 94,40% 48,88% 44,44% 41,26% 37,64% 41,53%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 74,08% 71,11% 87,01% 84,63% 114,99% 100,99% 198,69% 77,35% 119,80% 106,08% 94,56% 106,78%
Profit after Taxes 583.658 914.592 480.306 224.985 -360.852 -1.214.474 -2.926.000 618.000 -382.000 -4.540.000 20.000 -44.000
Basic earnings per share 1,39 1,92 0,84 0,32 -0,57 -12,70 -15,41 0,45 -1,83 -0,40 0,000 0,01
LIQUIDITY INDICATORS
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 3,63% 5,82% 2,34% 2,27% 5,26% 2,10% 1,56% 2,61% 2,28% 1,99% 1,91% 1,83%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 73,50% 80,33% 99,12% 102,64% 124,41% 138,48% 114,89% 102,29% 98,64% 105,62% 102,93% 98,14%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 4,98% 8,40% 3,48% 3,57% 9,66% 4,31% 2,97% 4,85% 4,24% 5,14% 3,71% 3,11%
CREDIT RISK INDICATOR
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 53,57% 55,68% 66,57% 65,35% 67,78% 67,54% 60,30% 55,02% 53,12% 40,79% 53,03% 57,82%
PROFITABILITY INDICATOR
ROE=Net Income/Equity 9,54% 13,99% 7,47% 2,74% -4,11% -11,40% 74,45% 9,68% -4,41% -54,60% 0,29% -0,65%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 0,95% 1,29% 0,57% 0,25% -0,37% -1,30% -3,75% 0,73% -0,47% -4,08% 0,03% -0,07%
ILLEGAL INDEX
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 9,99 10,87 13,03 11,09 10,97 8,74 -19,83 13,19 9,47 13,38 11,37 9,74
Pieaeus Bank 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 55,47% 53,91% 59,75% 54,29% 58,72% 66,28% 40,66% 22,46% 55,32% 57,39% 55,88% 48,81%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 23,91% 23,52% 28,45% 25,35% 26,52% 30,41% 18,69% 12,01% 28,10% 30,26% 26,52% 23,83%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 66,91% 65,27% 90,73% 77,31% 89,67% 102,69% 45,26% 24,73% 79,29% 79,46% 76,53% 73,18%
Profit after Taxes 340.084 423.191 113.148 145.939 -3.620 -6.428.843 -806.727 2.506.328 -2.065.200 -2.389.397 -40.143 -90.142
Basic earnings per share 1,23 1,45 0,3426 0,3865 -0,0057 -5,9138 -7,016 0,9093 -1,2774 -1,0759 -0,0036 -0,1568
LIQUIDITY INDICATORS
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 4,87% 4,88% 4,95% 3,57% 2,94% 5,19% 3,32% 2,23% 3,39% 2,95% 3,77% 4,72%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 128,23% 140,64% 138,88% 121,44% 129,68% 151,29% 120,93% 118,35% 107,46% 134,41% 117,33% 109,18%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 9,32% 10,86% 10,31% 6,79% 6,34% 13,11% 6,72% 3,94% 5,70% 6,65% 7,25% 7,69%
CREDIT RISK INDICATOR
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 67,03% 63,20% 66,68% 63,87% 60,23% 59,92% 59,69% 66,92% 63,81% 59,55% 60,99% 66,98%
PROFITABILITY INDICATOR
ROE=Net Income/Equity 20,89% 14,37% 4,31% 4,51% -0,12% 312,28% 29,40% 30,31% -27,96% -24,87% -0,41% -0,93%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 1,22% 1,00% 0,23% 0,30% -0,01% -12,56% -1,28% 2,92% -2,44% -2,88% -0,05% -0,13%
ILLEGAL INDEX
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 17,16 14,38 19,14 15,11 17,51 -24,87 -22,96 10,37 11,45 8,64 8,30 7,01
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levels and continues the balanced course. We see in this bank the downward trend in 
earnings with a clear increase in losses in 2011. 
4.3 Comparative Analysis of Main Financial Indicators 
This section presents the main financial ratios of Greek banks and calculates the 
average of the Greek banking sector. 
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUES 
This indicator shows the revenue of a bank in relation to her expenses , If the resulting 
percentage is less than 100%, this implies that the bank is profitable. Otherwise, that 
her total income is unable to over the costs incurred. 
Annex 27: TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUES 
 
From the reading of the table, we see that, despite the years of the crisis in Greece and 
the withdrawal of investor deposits and the minimization of borrowing, the banking 
sector keeps the index ratio at a reasonable level of profitability around 100%. 
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 
 
This indicator compares the bank's earnings with fees and staff costs to check how 
well the staff is working or not and whether there is excess work. In an attempt to 
reduce their costs, banks could turn to cuts in fees and expenses staff, which are the 
main source of costs for each banking institution. The Remuneration & Personnel / 
Total Revenue Index basically reflects the cost of staffing costs involved in making 
revenue. 
 
Annex 28: Personal Fees and Expenses/Total Revenues 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, we see that this indicator has a growth trend with 
attempts to reduce it. This can be explained by both the weakness of the banking 
industry, due to strong unions, of mass layoffs, and of the apparent inability of credit 
institutions to increase their revenue amidst a financial crisis. 
Net Interest Income/Total Revenues 
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 42,35% 49,07% 24,62% 20,57% 51,59% 47,32% 104,50% 65,99% 64,82% 54,09% 51,34% 45,52% 51,82%
ATTICA BANK 97,82% 81,25% 90,14% 88,74% 98,65% 329,79% 451,55% 334,73% 241,98% 63,41% 121,30% 90,59% 174,16%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 42,09% 41,35% 47,79% 48,37% 48,77% 50,45% 59,94% 67,49% 57,63% 57,72% 48,11% 48,13% 51,49%
NBG 45,81% 46,33% 52,00% 50,60% 61,57% 59,91% 132,38% 66,99% 69,69% 60,77% 53,29% 60,73% 63,34%
PIRAEUS 55,47% 53,91% 59,75% 54,29% 58,72% 66,28% 40,66% 22,46% 55,32% 57,39% 55,88% 48,81% 52,41%
TOTAL AVERAGE 56,71% 54,38% 54,86% 52,52% 63,86% 110,75% 157,81% 111,53% 97,89% 58,68% 65,98% 58,75% 78,64%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 22,73% 24,37% 77,48% 67,01% 24,28% 22,79% 49,98% 29,04% 27,54% 22,00% 21,28% 19,02% 33,96%
ATTICA BANK 45,81% 35,86% 39,92% 40,79% 43,06% 58,33% 104,37% 97,66% 41,05% 39,46% 40,92% 19,67% 50,57%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 23,78% 22,22% 14,95% 16,67% 15,49% 17,65% 21,20% 37,11% 31,12% 30,02% 26,33% 27,45% 23,67%
NBG 34,49% 34,56% 37,61% 37,75% 44,11% 44,93% 94,40% 48,88% 44,44% 41,26% 37,64% 41,53% 45,13%
PIRAEUS 23,91% 23,52% 28,45% 25,35% 26,52% 30,41% 18,69% 12,01% 28,10% 30,26% 26,52% 23,83% 24,80%
TOTAL AVERAGE 30,15% 28,10% 39,68% 37,51% 30,69% 34,82% 57,73% 44,94% 34,45% 32,60% 30,54% 26,30% 35,63%
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The net interest income to total income ratio is shown the percentage of revenue 
earned by a bank from its net interest income in its total income. Essentially, this 
indicator measures how much bank income comes from interest, from the bank's main 
activity, to borrowing. 
Annex 29: Net Interest/Total Revenues 
 
As shown in the above table, interest income is increasing are rising as a percentage 
of the total income of Greek banks, which is justified by the significant decline in the 
banks' activities, which now increasingly accrue to the interest earned on the loans 
they have made in the past. 
Cash and Balances to the Central Banks/Total Assets 
The Treasury and Available in the Central Bank / Total Assets indicator shows how 
much of the bank's revenue has as deposits in the Central Bank in relation to those 
that it has invested in loans. The minimum required reserves available to the Central 
Bank amounted to 2%, due to the crisis this percentage has been reduced to 1%. 
Annex 30: Cash and Balances to the Central Banks/Total Assets 
 
It is perceived by the table that the index Cash and Balances/Total Assets is showing 
fluctuations in the last years with a downward trend. A recovery occurs in 2010 due to 
the fact that funds were made available from the public to the banks, which were used 
as deposits in the Bank of Greece to strengthen their security net. 
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 
The Index Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers shows the relationship 
between the loans granted by the bank and the deposits it holds. An index of over 
100% indicates that there are more loan allocations than deposits. Generally, a bank 
should provide loans proportional to the money it holds as deposits. 
 
Annex 31: Loans and advances to customers/Due to customers 
 
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 70,30% 77,35% 77,48% 67,01% 81,34% 78,90% 127,28% 80,58% 81,03% 88,10% 80,60% 78,47% 82,37%
ATTICA BANK 67,19% 64,56% 72,41% 70,03% 76,41% 87,02% 75,61% 69,51% 76,26% 79,35% 81,83% 42,62% 71,90%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 77,98% 72,32% 72,78% 76,98% 77,09% 88,27% 83,25% 81,54% 81,85% 83,03% 75,07% 78,60% 79,06%
NBG 74,08% 71,11% 87,01% 84,63% 114,99% 100,99% 198,69% 77,35% 119,80% 106,08% 94,56% 106,78% 103,01%
PIRAEUS 66,91% 65,27% 90,73% 77,31% 89,67% 102,69% 45,26% 24,73% 79,29% 79,46% 76,53% 73,18% 72,58%
TOTAL AVERAGE 71,29% 70,12% 80,08% 75,19% 87,90% 91,58% 106,02% 66,74% 87,65% 87,20% 81,72% 75,93% 81,78%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 3,16% 3,05% 2,58% 4,02% 4,40% 2,18% 1,43% 1,48% 1,87% 1,08% 1,12% 1,92% 2,36%
ATTICA BANK 3,23% 4,22% 2,67% 2,78% 1,81% 2,53% 2,80% 1,75% 2,70% 1,35% 1,20% 1,07% 2,34%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 3,28% 1,84% 2,72% 1,73% 2,47% 1,96% 3,05% 2,56% 2,58% 2,44% 2,22% 2,06% 2,41%
NBG 3,63% 5,82% 2,34% 2,27% 5,26% 2,10% 1,56% 2,61% 2,28% 1,99% 1,91% 1,83% 2,80%
PIRAEUS 4,87% 4,88% 4,95% 3,57% 2,94% 5,19% 3,32% 2,23% 3,39% 2,95% 3,77% 4,72% 3,90%
TOTAL AVERAGE 3,64% 3,96% 3,05% 2,88% 3,38% 2,79% 2,43% 2,12% 2,56% 1,96% 2,04% 2,32% 2,76%
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As a result of the data we can see that the index Loans and advances to customers/Due 
to Customers it is higher than 100%. That will be an outcome not so much from 
borrowing funds due to the fact that during the crises this activity reduced 
scientifically. We can say that is index has this view because of many depositors have 
been withdrawn their money in the fear of an unexpected loss.  
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due to Customers 
The Index Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due to Customers is 
counterbalancing the bank's available cash in relation to the obligations to its 
customers, which in their turn are the result of their deposits. In general, the bank tries 
to maintain the indicator at a satisfactory level so as to be able to meet the demands of 
its customers, where it is the liquidation of deposits. 
Annex 32: Cash and Balances with Central Bank/Due to Customers 
 
 
 
Generally this index has a downward trend too, with a try to increase in 2010 due to 
the funds that have been given to the banks from the public sector. 
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 
The index Loans and advances to customers/ total Assets shows the loans that the 
bank has given to its customers, that is, it shows the demands that the business has for 
its customers. Also, on the basis of the indicator Loans and advances to customers/ 
total Assets , we can determine which part of the investments the bank has redeemed 
in the loans to indicate to us the percentage of the risk that has been exposed. 
Annex 33: Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 
 
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 138,61% 151,14% 124,76% 118,58% 127,81% 150,00% 141,42% 117,95% 114,96% 149,85% 138,79% 128,51% 133,53%
ATTICA BANK 95,56% 99,34% 114,52% 114,24% 111,37% 115,64% 110,56% 99,19% 97,70% 127,81% 145,68% 119,30% 112,58%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 99,41% 95,62% 105,15% 99,18% 118,25% 149,87% 140,38% 109,81% 103,07% 126,86% 114,77% 112,02% 114,53%
NBG 73,50% 80,33% 99,12% 102,64% 124,41% 138,48% 114,89% 102,29% 98,64% 105,62% 102,93% 98,14% 103,42%
PIRAEUS 128,23% 140,64% 138,88% 121,44% 129,68% 151,29% 120,93% 118,35% 107,46% 134,41% 117,33% 109,18% 126,48%
TOTAL AVERAGE 107,06% 113,41% 116,49% 111,22% 122,30% 141,06% 125,64% 109,52% 104,37% 128,91% 123,90% 113,43% 118,11%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due to Customers 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 7,25% 7,07% 5,10% 7,73% 8,98% 5,01% 3,32% 2,68% 3,35% 2,52% 2,32% 3,47% 4,90%
ATTICA BANK 4,13% 5,64% 4,07% 4,26% 2,59% 3,55% 3,73% 2,13% 3,27% 2,30% 2,27% 2,07% 3,33%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 5,40% 3,23% 5,70% 3,78% 5,50% 5,51% 6,72% 4,78% 4,77% 5,72% 4,34% 3,78% 4,94%
NBG 4,98% 8,40% 3,48% 3,57% 9,66% 4,31% 2,97% 4,85% 4,24% 5,14% 3,71% 3,11% 4,87%
PIRAEUS 9,32% 10,86% 10,31% 6,79% 6,34% 13,11% 6,72% 3,94% 5,70% 6,65% 7,25% 7,69% 7,89%
TOTAL AVERAGE 6,22% 7,04% 5,73% 5,23% 6,61% 6,30% 4,69% 3,68% 4,26% 4,46% 3,98% 4,02% 5,19%
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We can see a moderate increase over the years not in the increase in borrowing due to 
the economic crisis, but in the deterioration of other assets such as the haircut of 
available Greek government bonds. 
ROE=Net Income/Equity 
The index  Return on Equity reflects the return on equity of an invested bank's stock. 
If the index is low relative to other banks, then it is very difficult to raise capital from 
the market. This indicator is very important for the shareholders of the banking group. 
 
Annex 33: ROE=Net Income/Equity 
 
We can see that the index Return on Equity beyond the years has a significant 
decrease, in sometimes we van notice that has negative prices. This is for sure a 
mirror of the bad situation that Greek economy suffers including and the bank sector. 
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 
Return on assets (ROA) is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its 
total assets. ROA gives a manager, investor, or analyst an idea as to how efficient a 
company's management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Return on assets is 
displayed as a percentage. 
Annex 34: ROA= Net Income/Total Assets 
 
 
And with this is index it is obvious the bad situation in economy that Greece occurs, 
with this index take a negative view. 
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 60,38% 65,26% 63,22% 61,62% 62,60% 65,35% 60,99% 64,96% 64,28% 63,94% 66,66% 71,08% 64,19%
ATTICA BANK 74,88% 74,29% 74,92% 74,58% 77,60% 82,43% 82,97% 81,29% 80,59% 75,05% 76,73% 61,58% 76,41%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 60,30% 54,54% 50,24% 45,50% 53,02% 53,45% 63,81% 58,79% 55,79% 54,24% 58,83% 61,17% 55,81%
NBG 53,57% 55,68% 66,57% 65,35% 67,78% 67,54% 60,30% 55,02% 53,12% 40,79% 53,03% 57,82% 58,05%
PIRAEUS 67,03% 63,20% 66,68% 63,87% 60,23% 59,92% 59,69% 66,92% 63,81% 59,55% 60,99% 66,98% 63,24%
TOTAL AVERAGE 63,23% 62,60% 64,33% 62,18% 64,25% 65,74% 65,55% 65,39% 63,52% 58,71% 63,25% 63,73% 63,54%
ROE=Net Income/Equity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 20,62% 16,68% 14,11% 8,98% -1,27% -0,06% 263,25% 39,97% -0,86% -12,26% 0,46% 0,90% 29,21%
ATTICA BANK 3,35% 6,33% 3,19% 1,60% -1,15% -9,98% -19,70% -27,99% -14,28% -51,99% -2,45% 1,17% -9,33%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 15,02% 14,49% 18,87% 7,35% 1,38% -62,81% -219,85% -25,58% -18,97% -16,19% 3,39% 1,04% -23,49%
NBG 9,54% 13,99% 7,47% 2,74% -4,11% -11,40% 74,45% 9,68% -4,41% -54,60% 0,29% -0,65% 3,58%
PIRAEUS 20,89% 14,37% 4,31% 4,51% -0,12% 312,28% 29,40% 30,31% -27,96% -24,87% -0,41% -0,93% 30,15%
TOTAL AVERAGE 13,88% 13,17% 9,59% 5,04% -1,06% 45,60% 25,51% 5,28% -13,30% -31,98% 0,26% 0,31% 6,03%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 1,07% 0,85% 0,50% 0,63% -0,09% 0,00% -2,11% 4,20% -0,09% -1,59% 0,07% 0,14% 0,30%
ATTICA BANK 1,66% 5,13% 2,26% 1,78% -1,25% -5,83% -4,63% -27,87% -12,60% -95,12% -4,29% 2,09% -11,56%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 0,95% 1,03% 0,73% 0,32% 0,09% -0,69% -2,13% -1,49% -1,58% -1,57% 0,38% 0,12% -0,32%
NBG 0,95% 1,29% 0,57% 0,25% -0,37% -1,30% -3,75% 0,73% -0,47% -4,08% 0,03% -0,07% -0,52%
PIRAEUS 1,22% 1,00% 0,23% 0,30% -0,01% -12,56% -1,28% 2,92% -2,44% -2,88% -0,05% -0,13% -1,14%
TOTAL AVERAGE 1,17% 1,86% 0,86% 0,65% -0,33% -4,08% -2,78% -4,30% -3,44% -21,05% -0,77% 0,43% -2,65%
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TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 
It is known that corporations belonging to the banking industry usually have a lower 
return on assets than liabilities over other businesses. Companies are therefore obliged 
to use a large amount of financial leverage to be able to offer shareholders equity 
returns similar to other firms. However, when large financial leverage is used in a 
company's operations, then various changes in net operating earnings result in greater 
changes in earnings per share and hence in return on equity. If we associate this 
volatility with financial risk, then we see why financial leverage is a double-edged 
knife. 
Annex 35: Total Assets/Total Equity 
 
Despite its fluctuations, it shows a general picture showing growth rates and this is 
increasingly depreciating the participation of foreign capital in the Greek banks' 
balance sheets. 
Profit or losses after Taxes 
The Profit or Losses after Taxes is and indicator of the total carrying amount of a 
bank, since the purpose of each bank is to increase its profitability by making wage 
profits in the invested capital 
 
Annex 36: Profit or Losses after Taxes 
 
Observing the table in the overall and individual points we see that there is an 
increased reduction in the profits of the company and especially from 2010 and 
afterwards there is a dramatic decrease. In the last two years, the average returns to 
positive levels, but the overall average is negative. 
Basic earnings per share 
Τhis indicator Basic earnings per share is of interest to investors and shows the profits 
that can be gained from the bank's equity. The more profitable the stock is, the more 
attractive it is to invest in the bank and the more credible for the bank's course. 
 
Annex 37: Basic earnings per share 
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 19,20 19,72 28,17 14,21 14,39 98,88 -124,95 9,53 9,92 7,72 6,63 6,49 9,16
ATTICA BANK 2,02 1,23 1,41 0,90 0,92 1,71 4,25 1,00 1,13 0,55 0,57 0,56 1,36
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 15,83 14,03 25,95 23,23 14,83 90,98 103,29 17,15 11,98 10,31 9,03 8,82 28,79
NBG 9,99 10,87 13,03 11,09 10,97 8,74 -19,83 13,19 9,47 13,38 11,37 9,74 8,50
PIRAEUS 17,16 14,38 19,14 15,11 17,51 -24,87 -22,96 10,37 11,45 8,64 8,30 7,01 6,77
TOTAL AVERAGE 12,84 12,05 17,54 12,91 11,72 35,09 -12,04 10,25 8,79 8,12 7,18 6,52 10,91
Profit after Taxes 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 502293,00 457006,00 334238,00 428657,00 -56309,00 -384,27 -1132934,00 2857021,00 -58529,00 -1032276,00 42302,00 85081,00 202180,48
ATTICA BANK 51283,67 200285,00 102346,00 93501,00 -59969,00 -253442,00 -180886,00 -1131600,00 -499246,00 -3494848,00 -155130,00 74490,00 -437767,94
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 475000,00 705000,00 677000,00 316000,00 84000,00 -549600,00 -1440000,00 -1157000,00 -1196000,00 -1155000,00 249000,00 72000,00 -243300,00
NBG 583658,00 914592,00 480306,00 224985,00 -360852,00 -1214474,00 -2926000,00 618000,00 -382000,00 -4540000,00 20000,00 -44000,00 -552148,75
PIRAEUS 340084,00 423191,00 113148,00 145939,00 -3620,00 -6428843,00 -806727,00 2506328,00 -2065200,00 -2389397,00 -40143,00 -90142,00 -691281,83
TOTAL AVERAGE 390463,73 540014,80 341407,60 241816,40 -79350,00 -1689348,65 -1297309,40 738549,80 -840195,00 -2522304,20 23205,80 19485,80 -344463,61
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From the analysis of the table we see that an investor cannot benefit from his 
investment in Greek banks but from 2010 and afterwards he causes damages. 
Due from banks/Total Assets – Due from banks/Total Liabilities 
In the tables below, we see the obligations that banks have to the other bank 
institutions, The Bank Market is the market where banks are targeting when they have 
difficulty in getting cash to raise capital. However, although there is a tendency for 
borrowing borrowing, fewer banks can borrow capital. 
 
Annex 38: Due from Banks/Total Assets 
 
Annex 39: Due from Banks/Total Liabilities 
 
 
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 
 
Annex 40: Securities held for trading/Total Assets 
 
 
 
Basic earnings per share 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 1,28 1,13 0,75 0,82 -0,21 -7,33 -1,17 0,43 -0,24 -2,68 0,03 0,06 -0,59
ATTICA BANK 0,00 0,19 0,06 0,03 -0,06 -1,07 -0,77 -0,15 -0,04 -0,29 -0,01 0,00 -0,18
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 10,00 12,00 1,17 0,41 0,15 -10,42 -2,14 0,41 -9,06 -3,68 0,11 0,06 -0,08
NBG 1,39 1,92 0,84 0,32 -0,57 -12,70 -15,41 0,45 -1,83 -0,40 0,00 0,01 -2,17
PIRAEUS 1,23 1,45 0,34 0,39 -0,01 -5,91 -7,02 0,91 -1,28 -1,08 0,00 -0,16 -0,93
TOTAL AVERAGE 2,78 3,34 0,63 0,39 -0,14 -7,49 -5,30 0,41 -2,49 -1,63 0,03 -0,01 -0,79
Due from banks/Total Assets 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 13,22% 13,60% 12,62% 17,92% 13,84% 11,69% 12,32% 7,40% 6,97% 5,24% 4,82% 2,90% 10,21%
ATTICA BANK 13,02% 14,32% 13,88% 11,75% 6,38% 0,68% 1,34% 2,03% 1,09% 0,26% 0,13% 0,05% 5,41%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 10,38% 24,23% 34,06% 39,89% 32,62% 31,85% 6,94% 3,31% 4,05% 3,82% 4,16% 3,74% 16,59%
NBG 7,42% 6,08% 6,21% 6,45% 7,36% 7,87% 5,38% 4,13% 4,62% 2,52% 2,84% 2,86% 5,31%
PIRAEUS 10,62% 10,15% 9,23% 9,08% 8,54% 6,79% 4,16% 1,36% 1,10% 0,95% 0,15% 0,21% 5,19%
TOTAL AVERAGE 10,93% 13,68% 15,20% 17,02% 13,75% 11,78% 6,03% 3,64% 3,57% 2,56% 2,42% 1,95% 8,54%
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 15,44% 10,43% 16,31% 22,54% 29,37% 36,26% 48,03% 28,42% 25,96% 38,73% 32,17% 24,38% 27,34%
ATTICA BANK 9,61% 11,47% 23,64% 20,59% 16,27% 15,72% 18,71% 4,46% 5,13% 21,33% 28,33% 27,75% 16,92%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 23,07% 22,41% 29,72% 30,65% 37,07% 45,96% 42,94% 21,79% 16,70% 34,35% 20,94% 18,22% 28,65%
NBG 9,60% 12,57% 16,47% 20,16% 29,98% 33,83% 42,71% 31,44% 24,99% 22,62% 23,16% 14,97% 23,54%
PIRAEUS 16,85% 25,28% 28,77% 29,13% 39,29% 48,55% 51,59% 31,77% 29,04% 41,68% 33,15% 21,08% 33,02%
TOTAL AVERAGE 14,92% 16,43% 22,98% 24,61% 30,40% 36,06% 40,80% 23,58% 20,36% 31,74% 27,55% 21,28% 25,89%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 0,74% 0,49% 0,13% 0,10% 0,06% 0,02% 0,03% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03% 0,08%
ATTICA BANK 0,66% 0,56% 0,00% - - - - - - - - - 0,28%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 0,00% - - - - - - - - - - - -
NBG 20,09% 15,55% 2,05% 3,29% 1,12% - 1,34% 1,08% - - - - 4,07%
PIRAEUS 6,68% 10,40% 2,32% 2,13% 0,36% 0,44% 0,13% 0,03% 2,43% 2,90% 3,36% 3,85% 2,58%
TOTAL AVERAGE 5,63% 6,75% 1,13% 1,84% 0,51% 0,23% 0,50% 0,37% 1,22% 1,45% 1,68% 1,94% 1,75%
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We can see from the table that after 2009 the banks have significantly restricted their 
trading activities in an attempt to reduce the losses caused by the economic crisis. 
But we can see from the year 2014 it seems that is been an effort to increase the index 
and the trading activities of the banks become more vivid. 
Investment securities/Total Assets  
The same trend appears in the index of the investment portfolio with a downward 
trend indicating banks' reluctance to invest. However, in the last few years it has 
shown a small recovery. 
 
Annex 41: Investments securities/Total Assets 
 
 
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets  
Banks, especially before the onset of the financial crisis, have used the derivative 
financial instruments in an attempt to capitalize claims that in many cases were even 
precarious in order to contain the losses resulting from the impairment of these assets 
Annex 42: Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 
 
It is obvious that in the first years of examination till 2010 there has been a 
stabilization, after 2011 although it was an increase we can see lot of fluctuations.  
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 
The following table shows the participation of derivatives financial instruments 
(liabilities) to total liabilities. From it is understood that derivatives of liabilities are 
decreasing, following the trend of customer accounts for the the whole of the Greek 
banking sector. 
 
Annex 43: Derivative financial Liabilities/Total Liabilities 
Investment securities/Total Assets 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 16,05% 11,74% 0,06% 0,07% 0,07% 0,07% 0,06% 0,04% 0,05% 0,04% 0,05% 1,02% 2,44%
ATTICA BANK 4,01% 2,28% 0,64% 0,65% 0,92% 1,03% 1,11% 1,13% 1,17% 1,58% 1,56% 1,65% 1,48%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 20,02% 13,70% 2,75% 2,43% 2,27% 0,12% 0,91% 0,94% 1,16% 1,26% 1,36% 0,54% 3,96%
NBG 4,16% 3,57% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,65%
PIRAEUS 3,98% 3,01% 0,08% 0,25% 0,36% 0,39% 0,69% 0,34% 0,38% 0,38% 1,48% 1,67% 1,09%
TOTAL AVERAGE 9,64% 6,86% 0,71% 0,68% 0,73% 0,32% 0,55% 0,49% 0,55% 0,66% 0,89% 0,98% 1,92%
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 0,54% 0,71% 0,74% 0,55% 0,69% 1,11% 1,38% 1,19% 1,71% 1,22% 1,07% 0,93% 0,99%
ATTICA BANK 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,10% 0,09% 0,09% 0,03% 0,12% 0,28% 0,10% 0,00% 0,00% 0,07%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 2,29% 1,88% 1,78% 1,46% 1,91% 2,80% 2,79% 1,63% 2,83% 2,56% 2,98% 2,87% 2,32%
NBG 0,33% 0,47% 1,56% 1,83% 1,60% 2,67% 4,34% 3,07% 5,85% 3,50% 5,71% 5,41% 3,03%
PIRAEUS 0,39% 1,38% 0,71% 0,35% 0,27% 4,49% 0,67% 0,37% 0,60% 0,53% 0,55% 0,67% 0,92%
TOTAL AVERAGE 0,71% 0,89% 0,96% 0,86% 0,91% 2,23% 1,84% 1,27% 2,25% 1,58% 2,06% 1,98% 1,46%
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Due to customers/Total Liabilities 
The index Due to customers/Total Liabilities presents the obligation of the banking 
institution to pay interest to customers who have deposits in it. 
 
Annex 44: Due to Customers/Total Liabilities 
 
As a consequence of the economic crisis and the uncertainty surrounding the capital 
spreads, this was expected and the customer deposits of the banking institution to be 
reduced. 
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors and other borrowed 
funds/Total Liabilities 
In terms of  debt securities in issue 2007 to 2011, it is on a downward path, 
culminating in 2012, with a recovery trend in 2013, which is staggering over the next 
few years, as banks are called to seek capital from the private sector. 
 Annex 45: Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors and other borrowed 
funds/Total Liabilities 
 
 
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 
Taking into account recent economic developments and unfavorable position in which 
the Greek as well as the global economy has come, today more than ever arises from 
the need to create and increase the risk profile of Greek banks. In this climate, many 
Greek banks have made a provisioning account, and have even increased over time 
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 0,48% 0,71% 1,20% 0,93% 1,74% 2,51% 2,84% 2,02% 2,88% 2,39% 2,21% 1,68% 1,80%
ATTICA BANK 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,02% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 1,47% 1,37% 3,00% 2,15% 2,98% 3,74% 3,96% 2,01% 3,28% 3,21% 3,68% 3,25% 2,84%
NBG 0,56% 0,82% 1,70% 1,32% 1,46% 3,35% 5,61% 3,04% 6,96% 4,17% 6,58% 5,77% 3,45%
PIRAEUS 0,22% 0,20% 0,72% 0,33% 0,35% 0,64% 0,67% 0,38% 0,64% 0,54% 0,81% 0,63% 0,51%
TOTAL AVERAGE 0,55% 0,62% 1,33% 0,95% 1,31% 2,05% 2,62% 1,49% 2,75% 2,06% 2,66% 2,27% 1,72%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 43,56% 43,18% 50,67% 51,97% 48,98% 43,57% 43,13% 55,07% 55,91% 42,67% 48,03% 55,31% 48,50%
ATTICA BANK 78,36% 74,78% 65,42% 65,29% 69,68% 71,28% 75,04% 81,95% 82,48% 58,72% 52,67% 51,62% 68,94%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 60,66% 57,04% 47,78% 45,87% 44,84% 35,67% 45,46% 53,53% 54,13% 42,75% 51,26% 54,61% 49,47%
NBG 72,88% 69,32% 67,16% 63,67% 54,48% 48,77% 52,49% 53,79% 53,85% 38,62% 51,52% 58,92% 57,12%
PIRAEUS 52,27% 44,94% 48,01% 52,59% 46,44% 39,60% 49,36% 56,54% 59,38% 44,30% 51,98% 61,35% 50,57%
TOTAL AVERAGE 61,55% 57,85% 55,81% 55,88% 52,88% 47,78% 53,09% 60,18% 61,15% 45,41% 51,09% 56,36% 54,92%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 32,39% 37,98% 26,07% 15,34% 10,95% 9,04% 4,31% 1,90% 2,99% 0,63% 0,99% 0,77% 11,94%
ATTICA BANK 4,82% 3,82% 2,20% 1,79% 1,97% 2,17% 2,42% 1,95% 2,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,93%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 7,02% 11,60% 14,89% 15,32% 8,89% 8,07% -1,92% 5,37% 7,36% 8,73% 10,05% 11,26% 8,89%
NBG 0,00% 4,90% 4,15% 2,95% 3,30% 1,05% - - 2,13% 1,13% 0,68% 0,44% 2,07%
PIRAEUS 22,27% 20,53% 15,42% 10,03% 6,14% 4,47% -4,35% 9,64% 8,73% 11,58% 11,86% 14,26% 10,88%
TOTAL AVERAGE 13,30% 15,76% 12,55% 9,09% 6,25% 4,96% 0,11% 4,71% 4,64% 4,41% 4,72% 5,35% 7,14%
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the amount they maintain to cover against unexpected risks, while others have not yet 
set up a provisioning account. 
Annex 46: Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 1,14% 0,10% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,03% 0,06% 0,38% 0,49% 0,63% 0,63% 0,57% 0,34%
ATTICA BANK 1,38% 0,86% 0,54% 0,27% 0,26% 0,61% 0,86% 0,97% 0,69% 0,68% 0,47% 1,18% 0,73%
EUROBANK ERGASIAS - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NBG - - - - - 2,29% 2,78% 2,49% 1,18% 1,12% 1,42% 1,46% 1,82%
PIRAEUS - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TOTAL AVERAGE 1,26% 0,48% 0,28% 0,14% 0,14% 0,98% 1,23% 1,28% 0,79% 0,81% 0,84% 1,07% 0,96%
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CAPITAL ADEQUANCY OF THE MAJOR GREEK BANKS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Capital Adequacy is defined as the measure that tells us whether the capital of a bank 
(and generally a financial institution) is sufficient for the bank to be able to cope with 
potential losses on loans it has already given, and to be able to be in the future that is 
consistent with its own obligations and its own debts. Capital adequacy is considered 
to be one of the most important features of a bank. If a bank does not meet this 
criterion it is considered to be financially weak7 and extremely dangerous to become 
insolvent. This is because if a bank does not have a sufficient equity capital and is 
therefore only financed with foreign capital (from its depositors and lenders), then it 
knows that even if it does not go well and bankrupt its owners will not be harmed 
especially since they have no "money", so they may start to work boldly by taking 
high-risk investments and hence high-risk (such as giving loans without very strict 
criteria). In other words, it will relax its "self-defense mechanisms" against 
bankruptcy, which eventually can actually lead it there. On the other hand, if part of 
its funding comes from its owners' funds, they will want a more prudent management 
, since a possible bankruptcy would mean a loss of their own capital. For this reason, 
and because the bankruptcy of a banking institution can create many problems in an 
economy, as it would be the beginning of a generalized financial crisis, capital 
adequacy is necessary and controlled.28 
The core capital adequacy ratios of Greek banks are calculated with according to Law 
3601/2007 and the provisions of the PD / TE2630 / 29.10.2012 "Determination of the 
own funds of credit institutions having their registered office in Greece" and Bank of 
Greece Governor's Act 2588 / 20.8.2007 "Capital adequacy of credit institutions 
institutions in accordance with the standardized approach ". Banking institutions are 
required to publish the capital adequacy ratios as required by Basel II Pillar 3. 
It is noted that Greek banks are obliged to calculate the capital adequacy ratio and its 
objectivity and utilization. 
5.2 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Τhe total capital adequacy ratio of the main Greek banks that includes the capitals 
TIER I and TIER II on the basis of the published financial reports for the years 2006-
2017 is presented in the following table: 
Annex 47: Capital Adequacy Ratio Of Greek Banks 
 
 
                                                          
28 Source: Equities Daily, Capital Adequacy (Available at: https://www.dailyeconomics.gr/oikonomikoi-oroi/kefalaiakh-
eparkeia) 
TIER I + TIER II 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 12,9 12,5 9,3 13,2 13,6 5,5 14,4 16,4 14,6 16,8 17,1 17,9 13,68
ATTICA BANK 9,7 8,48 12,6 11,4 18,2 19 4,7 11,9 9,6 18,5 14,8 15 12,82
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 10,4 12,2 10,4 12,7 11,7 12 11,6 12,2 16,6 17,4 17,9 17,4 13,54
NBG 15,6 10,2 10,3 11,3 13,7 8,3 12 16,8 21,8 21,3 16,3 16,8 14,53
PIRAEUS 11 12,3 9,9 9,8 9,6 8,7 9,7 14 12,5 17,5 16,9 16,8 12,39
TOTAL AVERAGE 11,92 11,14 10,50 11,68 13,36 10,70 10,48 14,26 15,02 18,30 16,60 16,78 13,39
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Alpha Bank:   
Despite all the efforts to maintain the indicator at a specific level of  12% -13% in 
2011 see a sharp reduction to 5.5% before the support of the Financial Stability Fund. 
From 2012 onwards, a recovery at a steady pace is evident. 
Attica Bank: 
The capital adequacy ratio has been successful in the first years of the survey, with a 
significant decrease from 2010 to 19% in 2011 by 4.7%, from 2013 seems to be 
recovering and following an upward trend. 
Eurobank Ergasias Bank: 
In this bank is stable in the capital adequacy ratio with a decline in the year 2014 and 
steadily rising. 
National Bank of Greece: 
Starting from a 15% index following a range of fluctuations, it reached 8.3% in 2011 
after the funds of the Financial Stability Fund. By 2012 it seems to be booming with a 
maximum of the capital adequacy ratio in the years 201 and 2015 with 21 , 8% and 
21.3% respectively. 
Piraeus Bank: 
Piraeus Bank, following an effort to improve its capital adequacy ratio in the years 
2006 to 2007, showed a slight turning point in 2008-2010, which increased in 2011 
with a capital adequacy ratio of 8.70%. Since then there has been an upward trend in 
the index rate. 
 
5.3 Key Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
Τhe key capital adequacy ratio of the main Greek banks that includes the capitals 
TIER I on the basis of the published financial reports for the years 2006-2017 is 
presented in the following table: 
Annex 48: Key Capital Adequacy Ratio of Major Greek Banks 
 
From the above table and graph, it becomes clear that the Key Capital Adequacy 
follows the same trend as the General Index, with the adequacy of the Greek banks to 
initially present a turning point from which recovers in 2009 and 2010, but it is 
showing a significant decline in 2011, but there is a recovery from 2012, which is also 
growing in the next few years 
 
 
 
 
TIER I 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL AVERAGE
ALPHA BANK 10,2 9,6 7,4 11,6 11,9 4,2 13,9 16,1 14,3 16,6 17,1 17,80% 11,09
ATTICA BANK - 9,9 9,7 15,8 16,4 8,6 3,3 11,3 9,1 18,5 14,8 15 12,04
EUROBANK ERGASIAS 8,5 9,2 8 11,5 10,6 11,5 9,3 13,9 16,2 17 17,6 17,3 12,55
NBG 12,4 9,2 10 11,3 13,1 7,2 10,5 15,8 21,4 21,3 16,3 16,8 13,775
PIRAEUS 7,4 9,8 8 9,1 - - 9,3 13,9 12,4 17,5 16,9 16,8 12,11
TOTAL AVERAGE 9,63 9,54 8,62 11,86 13,00 7,88 9,26 14,20 14,68 18,18 16,54 13,22 12,31
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FINANCIAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE BANK’S CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
RATIO  
6.1 Introduction 
The direction of the capital adequacy ratio of the banking system may be affected by 
different financial factors that determine the overall picture of the banking institution. 
Of particular interest is the correlation between the capital adequacy ratio and the 
financial data of the banks as they arise from the analysis of the main financial indices 
of the Greek banks. 
In order to analyze any correlation that may exist between the capital adequacy ratio 
and the bank's financial data, the regression analysis through the program Microsoft 
Excel. 
Methodology: 
A. Separate the banks into Systemic and Non-Systemic, according of the Troika 
Sustainability Report systemic banks are the banks which will be 
recapitalized. 
Systemic Banks:                                                      Non-Systemic Banks: 
1.Aplha Bank                                                            1.Attica Bank 
2.Eurobank Ergasias Bank 
3.National Bank of Greece 
4.Piraeus Bank 
      B. Calculation of the bank’s Financial Ratios. 
      C. An estimation of the average of the sizes of banks per year with a distinction       
between systemic and non-systemic banks. Thus, all of the indices to be used in the 
regression analysis are:  
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Annex 49: Average of Capital Adequacy Ratio and Financial Ratios of Systemic Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systemic Banks 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL AVERAGE
TIER I AND TIER II 12,48% 11,80% 9,98% 11,75% 12,15% 8,63% 11,93% 14,85% 16,38% 18,25% 17,05% 17,23% 13,54%
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 46,43% 47,67% 46,04% 43,46% 55,16% 55,99% 84,37% 55,73% 61,87% 57,49% 52,15% 50,80% 54,76%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 26,23% 26,17% 39,62% 36,70% 27,60% 28,95% 46,07% 31,76% 32,80% 30,88% 27,94% 27,96% 31,89%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 72,32% 71,51% 82,00% 76,48% 90,77% 92,72% 113,62% 66,05% 90,49% 89,17% 81,69% 84,26% 84,26%
Profit after Taxes 475258,75 624947,25 401173,00 278895,25 -84195,25 -2048325,32 -1576415,25 1206087,25 -925432,25 -2279168,25 67789,75 5734,75 -321137,53
Basic earnings per share 3,48 4,13 0,78 0,48 -0,16 -9,09 -6,44 0,55 -3,10 -1,96 0,03 -0,01 -0,94
LIQUIDITY INDEX
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 3,74% 3,90% 3,15% 2,90% 3,77% 2,86% 2,34% 2,22% 2,53% 2,11% 2,26% 2,63% 2,87%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 109,94% 116,93% 116,98% 110,46% 125,04% 147,41% 129,41% 112,10% 106,03% 129,19% 118,45% 111,96% 119,49%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 6,74% 7,39% 6,15% 5,47% 7,62% 6,99% 4,93% 4,06% 4,51% 5,01% 4,41% 4,51% 5,65%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 6,88% 8,81% 1,50% 1,84% 0,51% 0,23% 0,50% 0,37% 1,22% 1,45% 1,68% 1,94% 2,24%
Investment securities/Total Assets 12,84% 9,14% 1,13% 1,04% 1,00% 0,14% 0,51% 0,45% 0,55% 0,59% 0,85% 0,76% 2,42%
PROFIT AND LOSS INDEX
ROE=Net Income/Equity 16,52% 14,88% 11,19% 5,89% -1,03% 59,50% 36,81% 13,60% -13,05% -26,98% 0,93% 0,09% 9,86%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 1,05% 1,04% 0,51% 0,37% -0,09% -3,64% -2,32% 1,59% -1,14% -2,53% 0,11% 0,01% -0,42%
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 15,01% 14,21% 20,76% 15,31% 13,89% 41,76% -15,30% 12,10% 10,32% 9,63% 8,50% 7,72% 12,83%
Risk Hazards index
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 0,89% 1,11% 1,20% 1,05% 1,12% 2,77% 2,29% 1,56% 2,75% 1,95% 2,58% 2,47% 1,81%
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 60,32% 59,67% 61,68% 59,08% 60,91% 61,57% 61,20% 61,42% 59,25% 54,63% 59,87% 64,26% 60,32%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 1,14% 0,10% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 1,16% 1,42% 1,43% 0,83% 0,88% 1,03% 1,02% 1,08%
PASSIVE STRUCTURE INDICATOR
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 16,24% 17,67% 22,82% 25,62% 33,93% 41,15% 46,32% 28,36% 24,17% 34,35% 27,36% 19,67% 28,14%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 57,34% 53,62% 53,41% 53,53% 48,69% 41,90% 47,61% 54,73% 55,82% 42,09% 50,70% 57,55% 51,41%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 0,68% 0,77% 1,66% 1,18% 1,63% 2,56% 3,27% 1,86% 3,44% 2,58% 3,32% 2,83% 2,15%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities 15,42% 18,75% 15,13% 10,91% 7,32% 5,66% -0,66% 5,64% 5,30% 5,51% 5,89% 6,68% 8,45%
Due from banks/Total Assets 10,41% 13,51% 15,53% 18,33% 15,59% 14,55% 7,20% 4,05% 4,19% 3,13% 2,99% 2,43% 9,33%
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Annex 50: Average of Capital Adequacy Ratio and Financial Ratios of Non-Systemic Banks 
 
D. Separate the Financial Ratios in 5 basic categories: 
1. Profit and Loss Index: Print out the major reason of operation of the bank 
institution, which is to achieve profits for the shareholders 
• ROE 
• ROA 
• TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 
 
2. Efficiency Ratios: The efficiency is associated with the use of the sources of 
the bank institution. 
• Total Expenses/Total Revenues 
• Personal Fees and Expenses/Total Revenues 
• Net Interest Income/Total Revenues 
• Profit and Losses after taxes 
• Basic Earnings per share 
 
3. Liquidity Ratios: Liquidity for a bank implies an immediate response to short-
term liabilities, planned or unforeseen, which may arise. 
Non-Systemic Banks 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL AVERAGE
TIER I AND TIER II 9,70% 8,42% 12,60% 11,40% 18,20% 19,00% 4,70% 11,90% 9,60% 18,50% 14,80% 15,00% 12,82%
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 97,82% 81,25% 90,14% 88,74% 98,65% 329,79% 451,55% 334,73% 241,98% 63,41% 121,30% 90,59% 174,16%
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE 45,81% 35,86% 39,92% 40,79% 43,06% 58,33% 104,37% 97,66% 41,05% 39,46% 40,92% 19,67% 50,57%
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 67,19% 64,56% 72,41% 70,03% 76,41% 87,02% 75,61% 69,51% 76,26% 79,35% 81,83% 42,62% 71,90%
Profit after Taxes 51283,67 200285,00 102346,00 93501,00 -59969,00 -253442,00 -180886,00 -1131600,00 -499246,00 -3494848,00 -155130,00 74490,00 -437767,94
Basic earnings per share 0,00 0,19 0,06 0,03 -0,06 -1,07 -0,77 -0,15 -0,04 -0,29 -0,01 0,00 -0,18
LIQUIDITY INDEX
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS 3,23% 4,22% 2,67% 2,78% 1,81% 2,53% 2,80% 1,75% 2,70% 1,35% 1,20% 1,07% 2,34%
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 95,56% 99,34% 114,52% 114,24% 111,37% 115,64% 110,56% 99,19% 97,70% 127,81% 145,68% 119,30% 112,58%
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 4,13% 5,64% 4,07% 4,26% 2,59% 3,55% 3,73% 2,13% 3,27% 2,30% 2,27% 2,07% 3,33%
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 0,66% 0,56% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,41%
Investment securities/Total Assets 4,01% 2,28% 0,64% 0,65% 0,92% 1,03% 1,11% 1,13% 1,17% 1,58% 1,56% 1,65% 1,48%
PROFIT AND LOSS INDEX
ROE=Net Income/Equity 3,35% 6,33% 3,19% 1,60% -1,15% -9,98% -19,70% -27,99% -14,28% -51,99% -2,45% 1,17% -9,33%
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 1,66% 5,13% 2,26% 1,78% -1,25% -5,83% -4,63% -27,87% -12,60% -95,12% -4,29% 2,09% -11,56%
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY 2,02% 1,23% 1,41% 0,90% 0,92% 1,71% 4,25% 1,00% 1,13% 0,55% 0,57% 0,56% 1,36%
Risk Hazards index
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS 74,88% 74,29% 74,92% 74,58% 77,60% 82,43% 82,97% 81,29% 80,59% 75,05% 76,73% 61,58% 76,41%
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,10% 0,09% 0,09% 0,03% 0,12% 0,28% 0,10% 0,00% 0,00% 0,07%
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 1,38% 0,86% 0,54% 0,27% 0,26% 0,61% 0,86% 0,97% 0,69% 0,68% 0,47% 1,18% 0,73%
PASSIVE STRUCTURE INDICATOR
Due to banks/Total Liabilities 9,61% 11,47% 23,64% 20,59% 16,27% 15,72% 18,71% 4,46% 5,13% 21,33% 28,33% 27,75% 16,92%
Due to customers/Total Liabilities 78,36% 74,78% 65,42% 65,29% 69,68% 71,28% 75,04% 81,95% 82,48% 58,72% 52,67% 51,62% 68,94%
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,02% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00%
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors 
and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities 4,82% 3,82% 2,20% 1,79% 1,97% 2,17% 2,42% 1,95% 2,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,93%
Due from banks/Total Assets 13,02% 14,32% 13,88% 11,75% 6,38% 0,68% 1,34% 2,03% 1,09% 0,26% 0,13% 0,05% 5,41%
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• Cash and Balances with Central Banks/Total Assets 
• Cash and Balances with Central Banks/Due to Customers 
• Loans and advances to customers/Due to customers 
• Securities held for trading/Total Assets 
• Investment Securities/Total Assets 
 
4. Risk Hazards Ratios: 
• Derivative Financial assets/Total Assets 
• Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets 
• Other Liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 
5. Passive Structure Indicators: 
• Due to banks/Total Liabilities 
• Due to customers/Total Liabilities 
• Derivative Financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 
• Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors and other 
borrowed funds/Total Liabilities 
E. Calculation of Regression with dependent variable the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
independent variable the Financial Indicators separate in the categories mentioned 
above. 
6.2 Regression Analysis 
 
6.2.1 Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Profit and Loss Index. 
 Basis of the above methodology, we perform a regression analysis, with a dependent 
index (Y), the Capital Adequacy Ratio, and independent (Xi) the Profit and Loss 
Index for both systemic and for non-systemic banks.  
The results of the regression are as follows: 
Systemic Banks: 
Annex 51: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Profit and Loss Index. 
 
The above analysis shows that a significant percentage of the capital adequacy ratio is 
dependent on the profitability indices for systemic banks with 𝑅2  = 81,28% and 
𝑅𝑎
2 =66%. Moving to hypothesis testing, the value of the criterion F is lower than the 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression statistics
Multiple R 0,812853488
R Square 0,660730794
Adjusted R Square 0,533504841
Standard Error 0,021263019
Observations 12
ANOVA
Df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 3 0,00704401 0,002348003 5,193364882 0,027810898
Residual 8 0,003616928 0,000452116
Total 11 0,010660938
Coefficients Standard Error t P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0,151675109 0,009013623 16,82731948 1,5759E-07 0,130889658 0,172460561 0,130889658 0,172460561
ROE=Net Income/Equity -0,103004492 0,031179868 -3,303557646 0,010801412 -0,174905397 -0,031103587 -0,174905397 -0,031103587
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY -0,057430772 0,053129749 -1,080953201 0,31122355 -0,179948193 0,065086649 -0,179948193 0,065086649
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets -0,29146228 0,407373625 -0,715466742 0,494669483 -1,230867544 0,647942983 -1,230867544 0,647942983
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degrees of freedom 5% that we have defined and hence the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is 
resected, that the calculated regression equation does not explain the value of the 
capital adequacy ratio. In analyzing the contribution of the sub-indices in the 
formulation of the capital adequacy ratio, on the basis of the analysis of P criteria for 
the individual profit indices, we see that the index ROE meet the criterion P < a=5% 
and are therefore important in the configuration of the capital adequacy ratio the index 
ROA is a little bit less and the index Total Assets/Total Equity is less 
P < a=5% where it can be assumed that they not affect the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Non-Systemic Banks 
Annex 52: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Profit and Loss Index 
 
The above analysis shows there is not such a significant percentage of the capital 
adequacy ratio is dependent on the profitability indices for non- systemic banks with 
𝑅2  = 0.68% and 𝑅𝑎
2 =0,45%. Moving to hypothesis testing, the value of the criterion 
F= 0,16 is higher than the degrees of freedom 5% that we have defined and hence the 
zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is not rejected In analyzing the contribution of the sub-indices in 
the formulation of the capital adequacy ratio, on the basis of the analysis of P criteria 
for the individual profit indices, we see that all the profit indexes do not meet the 
criterion P < a=5%  
where it can be assumed that they not affect the Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
 
6.2.2 Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Efficiency Index 
 
Basis of the above methodology, we perform a regression analysis, with a dependent 
index (Y), the Capital Adequacy Ratio, and independent (Xi) the Efficiency Index for 
both systemic and for non-systemic banks.  
The results of the regression are as follows: 
Systemic Banks: 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0,672617
R Square 0,452413
Adjusted R Square 0,247068
Standard Error 0,038485
Observations 12
ANOVA
Df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 3 0,009789335 0,003263112 2,203186163 0,165370996
Residual 8 0,011848701 0,001481088
Total 11 0,021638037
CoefficientsStandard Error t P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0,157349 0,022514157 6,988886472 0,000113896 0,105431147 0,209266624 0,105431147 0,209266624
ROE=Net Income/Equity 0,004106 0,234673758 0,017496057 0,986469361 -0,537052791 0,545264522 -0,537052791 0,545264522
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets -0,04073 0,148624077 -0,274045144 0,79099295 -0,383457443 0,30199803 -0,383457443 0,30199803
TOTAL ASSETS/TOTAL EQUITY -2,47122 1,547306136 -1,597114075 0,148907255 -6,039318757 1,096869941 -6,039318757 1,096869941
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Annex 53: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Efficiency Index. 
 
From the above analysis it appears that is not an important percentage of the capital 
adequacy ratio depends on the indicators 
with 𝑅2 = 57,80% and 𝑅𝑎
2 = 33,40%, the value of Criterion F is significantly higher 
than the 5% freedom we have set, and therefore the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is valid, that is 
it does not explain the estimated regression equation is the value of the Capital 
Adequacy Index. The same is presumed by the analysis of the P criteria for the 
individual indicators with values significantly higher than α = 5%. Efficiency 
indicators therefore do not interpret its value capital adequacy ratio for systemic 
banks. 
Non-Systemic Banks: 
Annex 54: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Efficiency Index 
SYMMARY OUTPUT
Refression Statistics
Multiple R 0,577993
R Square 0,334076
Adjusted R Square -0,22086
Standard Error 0,034398
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F significance F
Regressions 5 0,003562 0,000712 0,602008412 0,702945177
Residual 6 0,007099 0,001183
Total 11 0,010661
Coefficients+J1J17:Q17Standard Error t P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,161357 0,115801 1,3934 0,212927408 -0,121997771 0,444712 -0,122 0,444712
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE 0,206997 0,176248 1,174462 0,284708055 -0,224267346 0,638261 -0,22427 0,638261
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE -0,13673 0,226186 -0,60448 0,567661588 -0,690181657 0,416731 -0,69018 0,416731
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE -0,11387 0,202055 -0,56355 0,593478774 -0,608280338 0,380542 -0,60828 0,380542
Profit after Taxes -1,8E-08 1,91E-08 -0,96613 0,37128869 -6,52706E-08 2,83E-08 -6,5E-08 2,83E-08
Basic earnings per share 0,006081 0,005297 1,148077 0,294641731 -0,006879385 0,019041 -0,00688 0,019041
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From the above analysis also for the non-systemic banks, however an important 
percentage of the capital adequacy ratio depends on the indicators with 𝑅2 = 74,82% 
and 𝑅𝑎
2 = 55,98%, the value of Criterion F is significantly higher than the 5% freedom 
we have set, and therefore the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is valid, that is it does not explain 
the estimated regression equation is the value of the Capital Adequacy Index. The 
same is presumed by the analysis of the P criteria for the individual indicators with 
values significantly higher than P<α = 5%. Efficiency indicators therefore do not 
interpret its value capital adequacy ratio for non-systemic banks. 
 
6.2.3 Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Liquidity Index. 
 
 Basis of the above methodology, we perform a regression analysis, with a dependent 
index (Y), the Capital Adequacy Ratio, and independent (Xi) the Liquidity Index for 
both systemic and for non-systemic banks.  
The results of the regression are as follows: 
Systemic Banks: 
Annex 55: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Liquidity Index. 
Summary Output
Regression Statictics
Multiple R 0,748199
R Square 0,559801
Adjusted R Square 0,192969
Standard Error 0,039844
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 5 0,012113 0,002423 1,526042261 0,308724898
Residual 6 0,009525 0,001588
Total 11 0,021638
Coefficients+J1J17:Q17Standard Error t P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,139584 0,090527 1,541901 0,174035689 -0,081928218 0,361097 -0,08193 0,361097
TOTAL EXPENSES/TOTAL REVENUE -0,02075 0,026991 -0,76874 0,471215904 -0,086794206 0,045296 -0,08679 0,045296
Personnel Fees and Expenses/TOTAL REVENUE -0,05472 0,109745 -0,4986 0,635809431 -0,323254516 0,213817 -0,32325 0,213817
Net Interest Income/TOTAL REVENUE 0,046749 0,128833 0,36286 0,729149193 -0,268495203 0,361992 -0,2685 0,361992
Profit after Taxes -1E-08 1,33E-08 -0,7526 0,480163955 -4,25825E-08 2,25E-08 -4,3E-08 2,25E-08
Basic earnings per share -0,08179 0,05914 -1,38297 0,215940569 -0,226497837 0,062921 -0,2265 0,062921
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From the above analysis, however an important percentage of the capital adequacy 
ratio depends on the indicators with 𝑅2 = 75,50% and 𝑅𝑎
2 = 57,01%, the value of 
Criterion F is significantly higher than the 5% freedom we have set, and therefore the 
zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is valid, that is it does not explain the estimated regression 
equation is the value of the Capital Adequacy Index. The same is presumed by the 
analysis of the P criteria for the individual indicators with values significantly higher 
than P< α = 5%. Liquidity indicators therefore do not interpret its value capital 
adequacy ratio for systemic banks. 
Non-Systemic Banks: 
Annex 56: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Liquidity Index. 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0,755046
R Square 0,570094
Adjusted R Square 0,211839
Standard Error 0,027638
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 5 0,006078 0,001216 1,591306 0,29244
Residual 6 0,004583 0,000764
Total 11 0,010661
Coefficients+J1J17:Q17Standard Error t P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,356201 0,284402 1,252457 0,257008 -0,3397 1,052107 -0,3397 1,052107
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS -3,82421 9,409053 -0,40644 0,698519 -26,8473 19,19891 -26,8473 19,19891
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers -0,10214 0,246923 -0,41366 0,6935 -0,70634 0,502055 -0,70634 0,502055
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due to Customers 0,052295 4,908776 0,010653 0,991845 -11,959 12,06364 -11,959 12,06364
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 0,494895 0,813254 0,608537 0,565142 -1,49507 2,484855 -1,49507 2,484855
Investment securities/Total Assets -0,13277 0,557881 -0,23799 0,819809 -1,49786 1,232317 -1,49786 1,232317
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0,699045
R Square 0,488663
Adjusted R Square 0,062549
Standard Error 0,042942
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F significance F
Regressions 5 0,010574 0,002115 1,14679 0,428737
Residual 6 0,011064 0,001844
Total 11 0,021638
Coefficients+J1J17:Q17Standard Error t P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,243179 0,237604 1,023463 0,345569 -0,33822 0,824576 -0,33822 0,824576
Cash and balances with Central Banks/TOTAL ASSETS -5,48445 9,504545 -0,57703 0,5849 -28,7412 17,77233 -28,7412 17,77233
Loans and advances to customers/Due to Customers 0,03982 0,199041 0,200058 0,848044 -0,44722 0,526855 -0,44722 0,526855
Cash and balances with Central Banks/Due t Customers 0,339698 7,517919 0,045185 0,965426 -18,056 18,73538 -18,056 18,73538
Securities held for trading/Total Assets 22,26836 27,10609 0,821526 0,442759 -44,0579 88,59458 -44,0579 88,59458
Investment securities/Total Assets -4,43458 5,568826 -0,79632 0,456188 -18,061 9,19185 -18,061 9,19185
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Also for the Non-Systemic banks the value of Criterion F is significantly higher than 
the 5% freedom we have set, and therefore the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is valid, that is it 
does not explain the estimated regression equation is the value of the Capital 
Adequacy Index. The same is presumed by the analysis of the P criteria for the 
individual indicators with values significantly higher than P<α = 5%. Liquidity 
indicators therefore do not interpret its value capital adequacy ratio for non-systemic 
banks. 
 
6.2.4 Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Risk Hazard Index. 
 
 Basis of the above methodology, we perform a regression analysis, with a dependent 
index (Y), the Capital Adequacy Ratio, and independent (Xi) the Risk Hazard Index 
for both systemic and for non-systemic banks.  
The results of the regression are as follows: 
Systemic Banks: 
Annex 57: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Risk Hazard Index. 
 
From the above analysis, the value of Criterion F is significantly higher than the 5% 
freedom we have set, and therefore the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is valid, that is it does not 
explain the estimated regression equation is the value of the Capital Adequacy Index. 
The same is presumed by the analysis of the P criteria for the individual indicators 
with values significantly higher than P< α = 5%. Risk Hazard indicators therefore do 
not interpret its value capital adequacy ratio for systemic banks 
Non-Systemic Banks: 
 Annex 58: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Risk Hazard Index. 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Refression Statistics
Multiple R 0,549292144
R Square 0,30172186
Adjusted R Square 0,039867557
Standard Error 0,030504712
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 3 0,003217 0,001072 1,152251 0,385719
Residual 8 0,007444 0,000931
Total 11 0,010661
Coefficients Standard Error t P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,420537887 0,245072 1,715977 0,124503 -0,1446 0,985675 -0,1446 0,985675
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 1,239696965 1,554733 0,79737 0,448254 -2,34552 4,824917 -2,34552 4,824917
Loans and advances to customers/Total Assets -0,524361721 0,408125 -1,28481 0,23481 -1,4655 0,416777 -1,4655 0,416777
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities 1,154709316 2,034036 0,567694 0,585818 -3,53579 5,845204 -3,53579 5,845204
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Also for the Non-Systemic banks the value of Criterion F is significantly higher than 
the 5% freedom we have set, and therefore the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is valid, that is it 
does not explain the estimated regression equation is the value of the Capital 
Adequacy Index. The same is presumed by the analysis of the P criteria for the 
individual indicators with values significantly higher than P< α = 5%. Liquidity 
indicators therefore do not interpret its value capital adequacy ratio for non-systemic 
banks. 
 
6.2.5 Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Passive Structure Index. 
 
 Basis of the above methodology, we perform a regression analysis, with a dependent 
index (Y), the Capital Adequacy Ratio, and independent (Xi) the Passive Structure 
Index for both systemic and for non-systemic banks.  
The results of the regression are as follows: 
Systemic Banks: 
Annex 59: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Passive Structure Index. 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Refression Statistics
Multiple R 0,48464486
R Square 0,23488064
Adjusted R Square -0,05203912
Standard Error 0,045491319
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 3 0,005082356 0,001694 0,818628 0,51904
Residual 8 0,016555681 0,002069
Total 11 0,021638037
Coefficients Standard Error t P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,37425313 0,213816209 1,75035 0,11817 -0,11881 0,867314 -0,11881 0,867314
Loans and advances to customers/TOTAL ASSETS -0,268660816 0,273504411 -0,98229 0,354727 -0,89936 0,362041 -0,89936 0,362041
Derivative financial assets/Total Assets 3,868046125 18,90560374 0,204598 0,842996 -39,7284 47,46445 -39,7284 47,46445
Other liabilities and Provisions/Total Liabilities -5,944227799 4,274764566 -1,39054 0,201825 -15,8019 3,913397 -15,8019 3,913397
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The above analysis shows that a significant percentage of the capital adequacy ratio is 
dependent on the profitability indices for systemic banks with 𝑅2  = 92,14% and 
𝑅𝑎
2 =84,93%. Moving to hypothesis testing, the value of the criterion F is lower than 
the degrees of freedom 5% that we have defined and hence the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is 
resected, that the calculated regression equation does not explain the value of the 
capital adequacy ratio. In analyzing the contribution of the sub-indices in the 
formulation of the capital adequacy ratio, on the basis of the analysis of P criteria for 
the individual passive structure indices, we see that the index Due to banks/Total 
Liabilities ,Due to customers/Total Liabilities and Debt securities in issue held by 
institutional investors and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities meet the criterion P 
< a=5% and are therefore important in the configuration of the capital adequacy ratio 
the index. Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities is less than 
P < a=5% where it can be assumed that they not affect the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Non-Systemic Banks 
Annex 60: Correlation of Capital Adequacy Ratio with Passive Structure Index 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Refression Statistics
Multiple R 0,921627
R Square 0,849396
Adjusted R Square 0,763337
Standard Error 0,015145
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 4 0,009055 0,002264 9,869897 0,005267
Residual 7 0,001606 0,000229
Total 11 0,010661
CoefficientsStandard Error t P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,730256 0,157698 4,630708 0,002396 0,357358 1,103153 0,357358 1,103153
Due to banks/Total Liabilities -0,76223 0,155386 -4,90539 0,001742 -1,12966 -0,3948 -1,12966 -0,3948
Due to customers/Total Liabilities -0,54917 0,179358 -3,06185 0,018276 -0,97328 -0,12505 -0,97328 -0,12505
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities -0,52874 0,95783 -0,55202 0,59811 -2,79365 1,736168 -2,79365 1,736168
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities -1,02436 0,25925 -3,95126 0,005523 -1,63739 -0,41133 -1,63739 -0,41133
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regrassion Satistics
Multiple R 0,752883
R Square 0,566833
Adjusted R Square 0,319308
Standard Error 0,036592
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regressions 4 0,012265 0,003066 2,290008 0,015962
Residual 7 0,009373 0,001339
Total 11 0,021638
CoefficientsStandard Error t P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95%Upper 95%
Intercept 0,588501 0,314555 1,870898 0,103541 -0,1553 1,332307 -0,1553 1,332307
Due to banks/Total Liabilities -0,55703 0,420094 -1,32597 0,026479 -1,5504 0,436333 -1,5504 0,436333
Due to customers/Total Liabilities -0,5255 0,377191 -1,3932 0,02062 -1,41742 0,366413 -1,41742 0,366413
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities 316,4597 219,2679 1,443256 0,019216 -202,027 834,9458 -202,027 834,9458
Debt securities in issue held by institutional investors and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities -0,6082 1,206792 -0,50398 0,629746 -3,46181 2,245408 -3,46181 2,245408
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The above analysis also for the Non-Systemic Banks shows that a significant 
percentage of the capital adequacy ratio is dependent on the profitability indices for 
systemic banks with 𝑅2  = 75,28% and 𝑅𝑎
2 =56,68%. Moving to hypothesis testing, 
the value of the criterion F is lower than the degrees of freedom 5%  that we have 
defined and hence the zero hypothesis 𝐻0 is resected, that the calculated regression 
equation does not explain the value of the capital adequacy ratio. In analyzing the 
contribution of the sub-indices in the formulation of the capital adequacy ratio, on the 
basis of the analysis of P criteria for the individual passive structure indices, we see 
that the index Due to banks/Total Liabilities ,Due to customers/Total Liabilities and 
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities   meet the criterion P < a=5% and are 
therefore important in the configuration of the capital adequacy ratio the index. Debt 
securities in issue held by institutional investors and other borrowed funds/Total 
Liabilities is less than 
P < a=5% where it can be assumed that they not affect the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
 
6.3 Results of Regression Analysis 
 
The above analysis aimed to find a correlation, if it is existed, with the capital 
adequacy ratio and the main economic indicators that portray the financial position of 
a banking institution. 
In order to occur a valid analysis regression, it was seemed appropriate the distinction 
of the banks into systemic and non-systemic, due to the significant differences that 
factor entails in size, organization and operation of bank institutions. 
In addition, the financial indicators were grouped together with aim to look at the 
correlation of the capital adequacy ratio with each of the individual categories of 
indicators, including profitability and leverage, efficiency, liquidity, risks and risks 
composition of liabilities. 
The results of the regression analysis show us a different behavior of Capital 
Adequacy Ratio of Systemic and Non-Systemic Banks, with different factors affect 
the ratio in each category.  
As concern as the Systemic Banks, the profit index ROE seems to affect the capital 
adequacy ratio, as well as the index Total Assets/Total Equity, which is justified by 
the high degree of leverage in Greek Banks and the need to de-escape them, in an 
effort to rehabilitate it their financial situation. From the other side, the profit index 
ROA seems to have no correlation with the capital adequacy ratio. 
As everyone would expect that efficiency, liquidity and Risk Hazard indicators to 
play a significant role in the behavior of capital adequacy ratio, no relationship was 
founded between them.  
For the Passive Structure Indicators, we can see that a have an affection on the capital 
adequacy ratio, and more specific the Due to banks/Total Liabilities, Due to 
customers/Total Liabilities and Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities   
indicators seem to configurate the behavior of capital adequacy ratio. The Debt 
securities in issue held by institutional investors and other borrowed funds/Total 
Liabilities it is founded that It is not correlated with the capital adequacy ratio. 
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From the other hand, as concern as the non-systemic banks the only correlation was 
founded was with the passive structure indicators and more specific the Due to 
banks/Total Liabilities, Due to customers/Total Liabilities and Debt securities in issue 
held by institutional investors and other borrowed funds/Total Liabilities indicators 
are these indexes that have effect on capital adequacy ratio in non-systemic banks. 
Derivative financial liabilities/Total Liabilities seem not to have any correlation. We 
can see that for the same category different indicators affecting the systemic and no 
systemic banks. 
With the other categories of the indexes we were not able to find any correlation with 
the non-systemic banks and capital adequacy ratio. 
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